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Executive summary 
 
 
Background and context 
 
In the literature of growth and productivity convergence, the Republic of Korea has been 
one of the most often-cited countries. There seem to be three main reasons why the 
Korean case has attracted a great deal of attention from the researchers of growth and 
productivity. The first reason is, naturally, Korea’s episode of rapid growth over the 
period of 35 years from 1962 to1997, which was termed an “economic miracle” by Lucas 
(1993). The second reason is the relatively well-maintained available data on basic 
growth and productivity performance such as GDP, employment, and investment, etc. 
The third reason could be its recent episode of financial crisis in 1997 with the sudden 
slump in productivity and growth. In these respects, the Korean episode of rapid growth 
and sudden slump seems to warrant a renewed analysis and explanation.  
 
  
Growth of the economy and productivity trends 
 
Korea recorded the highest growth rate (7.89%) of GDP in constant 1996 Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) prices. It had negative growth in 1980 (- 3.38%) after the second oil 
crisis and in 1998 (- 8.21%) after the Asian financial crisis. Except for these two years, it 
succeeded in achieving a remarkably high growth for four decades. The corresponding 
estimates in Korea’s manufacturing sector during the period of 1964-2000 are the average 
annual growth rate of labor productivity in manufacturing (8.24%); the average annual 
growth rate of per capita capital in manufacturing (8.35%); and the average annual 
growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) in manufacturing (4.40%). Therefore, we 
conclude: 
 
1) The growth accounting at the economy-wide aggregate level over the period of 1962-
2000 in Korea exhibited a capital-input-driven growth rather than TFP-led growth, 
confirming the Krugman (1994) proposition. The relative contribution of TFP growth to 
total GDP growth was only 5.5 percent. It also confirms Nadiri’s (1972) proposition that 
the relative contribution of TFP to output growth is small in developing economies as 
compared to its critical importance in industrialized economies. 
 
2) The manufacturing sector in Korea has accumulated capital at a faster rate (11.21%) 
than the aggregate economy (8.43%), and has increased employment, too, at a faster rate 
(5.32%) than the aggregate economy (2.78%). Its growth rate in capital deepening 
(8.35%) is almost the same as the economy-wide growth rate (8.43%). But the relative 
contribution of TFP in manufacturing (32.9%) is much more significant than that at the 
aggregate economy-wide level (5.5%). Therefore, Korea’s rapid growth was 
manufacturing-led growth, and the significant contribution of its TFP seems to have 
exercised a spillover effect into other sectors such as the primary sector and the service 
sector, mitigating their lower TFP. The estimated share of labor income in manufacturing 
(54%) was higher than that in the aggregate economy (45%), due to higher rates of 
growth in employment, even though the average wage rate in manufacturing was lower 
than the rest of the sectors. 
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The data provided by UNIDO indicates an episode of rapid productivity convergence: 
Korea’s per-capita income in 1961 was about 15.27 percent of US per-capita income but 
it reached the level of 48.4 percent of US per-capita income over four decades. We can 
explain the Korean experience of rapid productivity convergence through three stages. 
 
During the first stage (1962-1976) of economic development, the Park government 
adopted a vent-for-surplus type development strategy. The First Five-Year Development 
Period (1962-1966) can be characterized as a period of explosive export growth. The 
export amount in current US dollars increased from US$54.8 million in 1962 to 
US$253.7 million, or by about five times. Helped by extraordinary export performance, 
the annual average GDP growth rate increased at 8.5%, exceeding the target rate (7.1%). 
In general, it was a period when the nationalistic feeling was very high. The foreign direct 
investments did not receive much credit, due to strong anti-Japanese sentiment, and the 
Park government, therefore, opted for inducing project loans from the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank and using them for basic industries such as steel 
and cement and social infrastructure such as highways and railroads and power plants, etc. 
Most private projects were awarded to private firms, usually to qualified conglomerates, 
through the Korea Development Bank, the Korea Export Import Bank, the Korea Medium 
and Small Enterprise Bank and other commercial banks, through syndicated loans or 
government-subsidized policy loans. For getting next-round loans, one of the most 
important criteria was export performance by the loan-awarded companies.  
 
Both the government and banks monitored the companies’ performances. This criterion of 
export-performance exercised a constant pressure on private firms and their owners and 
entrepreneurs so that they were almost obsessed with how to sell their products in 
overseas market. Even though there must have been a lot of distortion effect, the explicit 
criterion of export priority reduced the arbitrariness by bureaucrats and bankers and made 
the monitoring system relatively more transparent than that under the import substitution 
system. 
 
Entering the second stage (1977-1986), the Korean economy experienced the second oil 
crisis in the early 1980s, and had to go through restructuring the past investments in 
heavy and chemical industries made during the late 1970s. But this was the period when 
major conglomerates such as Samsung, Lucky Goldstar (LG) and Hyundai started 
investing in semi-conductor industries because they anticipated the technology frontier in 
that industry and because the government wanted to promote competition in the industry. 
During this period the Korean government moved from a direct industrial support policy 
to an indirect support policy. For example, they tried to shift the paradigm of industrial 
promotion from directly subsidizing an industry such as steel or automobiles to indirectly 
promoting investments in energy saving, conserving the environment, and introducing 
new technologies through enhanced R&D programs. It was also a period in which trade 
liberalization before capital market opening was seriously deliberated as a backdrop 
against rising wages and trade unionism. 
 
The third stage (1987-2000) is characterized by a turbulent transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a more democratic one. It was a period in which Korea pursued 
import liberalization and capital market opening by joining the WTO and the OECD. It 
was a period when Korean conglomerates engaged in excessive competition in a pattern 
of monopolistic competition across industries. Many of them invested in pre-emptive 
investment projects in non-tradable sectors to stay alive against increasing foreign and 
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domestic competition. The monitoring system by both government and banks became less 
transparent and a lax financial supervision created a vast network of moral hazard. It was 
also a period of rapidly declining rates of return on capital in Korea. As the Independent 
Evaluation Office of the IMF described it, the Korean financial crisis of 1997 was a twin 
crisis: both a foreign exchange crisis and a domestic credit crunch. During the post-crisis 
IMF programs, there was both corporate and financial restructuring, and about two-thirds 
of the top 30 conglomerates went bankrupt. But toward the end of this stage, the Korean 
economy was affected by the New Economy and the IT revolution. There was 
substitution of investments from conventional non-IT sectors to IT sectors. However, the 
employment absorption by IT sectors was rather weak and, once the IT boom was over by 
1999, the investment became quite stagnant, casting doubt on new sources of sustainable 
growth for the Korean economy. 
 
My explanation of this significant episode of rapid productivity convergence by Korea is 
based on two key phrases: ‘potential initial conditions’ and ‘structural change and 
transformation’. By ‘potential initial conditions’, I mean that we need to identify the state 
of initial conditions of the country not only by visible and quantifiable indicators but also 
by often-hidden indicators. These hidden indicators are known as deep determinants 
(Rodrik et al., 2002), and are typically of a social, religious and political nature. Among 
the potential initial conditions, I argue that historical heritages, which are often embodied 
in institutions and commercial practices, are the most important determinant because they 
ultimately shape policy environments and determine the success or failure of later 
development programs. 
 
In the case of Korea, I can single out three such initial conditions among hundreds of 
potential conditions. The first is a colonial heritage that the primary school enrollment 
ratio was once increased from less than 5 percent to 30 percent in the 1930s. The second 
is the episode of an early land reform after independence before interest groups could be 
formed and allied. The third is the expansion of primary education in the mid-1950s 
under the influence of the American mass-education system. The first and the third 
elements combined formed the basis of what I define as the two-tier system of human 
capital, which is a unique historical heritage of Korea. 
 
In summary, the episode of rapid productivity convergence in Korea was made possible 
by the successful adoption of a development strategy based on incremental comparative 
advantage and industrial restructuring on the initiative of the government. It was a 
consequence of interaction between market forces and government intervention. 
 
 
Assessment of the major determinants of productivity 
 
Among numerous determinants which must have mutually interacted, I would, without 
hesitation, rate human capital determined by historical precondition as the most important. 
The enlargement of primary education and upward mobility in the education system are 
the key elements in improving a nation’s stock of human capital. Human capital enhances 
knowledge, absorptive capacity, indigenous R&D efforts, and institutional environments. 
 
The second most important determinant is the maturity of social institutions and political 
stability. Without maturity and stability in socio-economic institutions, a development 
program cannot be maintained. We can find numerous histories of failure in development 
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programs in modern world history. Most of them have failed not because there was a lack 
of physical capital or resources but because there was social disruption and political 
instability. 
 
 
Discussion of policies with effect on productivity  
 
It is well known that increased spending on R&D can lead to the discovery of new 
technologies or the development of new products that contribute to higher productivity. 
But in many developing countries, R&D can be wasted because of a lack of R&D 
infrastructure and motivation for indigenous R&D effort. Korea was no exception. It was 
only after experiencing two-rounds of oil crisis and the first year of negative real GDP 
growth (-2.1%) in 1980 that the new government of the post-Park regime realized the 
limitation of extensive growth based on factor accumulation and capacity expansion 
under the “ Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Policy ” and started to seek new 
sources of growth. According to MCI, the policy targets announced in February 1982 
included export promotion with enhanced value-added, the upgrading and rationalizing of 
industrial structure, and the enhancement of industrial competitiveness through 
maintaining balanced growth among different sectors.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The overall assessment of the macroeconomic performance of Asian-Crisis countries is 
that the rebound of growth over the period of 1999-2000 slowed down in the subsequent 
period of 2001-2003, mainly because of stagnant demand for domestic investment across 
all crisis-inflicted economies. In particular, the domestic investment in machinery and 
equipment was very disappointing. For example, in the case of Korea, its average annual 
growth rate was 17 percent during the pre-crisis period of 1994-1996, and became 
negative during the crisis-years in 1997 (-9.6%) and 1998 (-42.3%). Then the average 
annual growth rate became explosively positive in 1999 (36.8%) and 2000 (33.6%), but 
suddenly dropped in 2001 (-9.0%), 2002 (7.5%) and 2003 (-1.2%). 
  
In order to resume sustainable growth and renew the productivity convergence, Korea 
needs to find a new paradigm and system under drastically changed social and political 
landscapes.  
 
The Korean economy has been struggling to find such a path under a non-authoritarian 
regime. It may take much longer than expected because, under the current mode of 
globalization, relying on market mechanism seems to be the only solution for a small 
open economy like Korea’s. 
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I. Productivity performance in Korea: Introduction 
 
 
1.1   Overview and context 
 
In the literature of growth and productivity convergence, the Republic of Korea 
(hereinafter called Korea) has been one of the most often-cited countries (see, for 
example, Lucas (1993), Young (1994), Baumol, Nelson and Wolff (1994), and Rodrik 
(2003)). There seem to be mainly three reasons why the Korean case has attracted a great 
deal of attention from the researchers of growth and productivity. The first reason is, 
naturally, Korea’s episode of rapid growth over the period of 35 years from 1962 to1997,, 
which was termed an “economic miracle” by Lucas (1993). The second reason is the 
relatively well-maintained available data on basic growth and productivity performance 
such as GDP, employment, and investment, etc., as documented in Pyo (2002). The Bank 
of Korea published National Income Accounts for the period of 1953-1970 (old accounts) 
and 1970-2003 (new accounts). The National Statistical Office has published a national 
wealth survey (capital stock) for four benchmark years (1968, 1977, 1987 and 1997). The 
third reason could be its recent episode of financial crisis in 1997 with the sudden slump 
in productivity and growth. In these respects, the Korean episode of rapid growth and 
sudden slump seems to warrant a renewed analysis and explanation.  
The actual time span of the period to be covered by the present case study can be divided 
into three stages as follows: 
 
The First Stage (1962-1976): 
The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan was launched by President Park in 
1962. Under this plan, Korea invested in basic infrastructure (highway and ports, etc.) and 
basic industries (steel and cement, etc.) and light manufactures (clothing and electronics, 
etc.) until the first oil crisis (1974). 
 
The Second Stage (1977-1986): 
This period involved Korea’s investment in heavy and chemical industries, and regime-
change from President Park to the Post-Park authoritarian regime under President Chun. 
During this period, Korean conglomerates went through the restructuring of heavy and 
chemical industries and entered into semi-conductor industries. 
 
The Third Stage (1987-2000): 
This was Korea’s turbulent transition period after hosting the 1988 Olympic Games, with 
a movement toward more democratic regimes and trade and financial liberalization, 
including accession to the WTO and the OECD, until the financial crisis in 1997. The 
post-crisis recovery was attempted but the stagnation of investment continued while, on 
the other hand, the IT revolution created a new socio-political environment. 
 
The present report is organized as follows: In this section we will analyze productivity 
change over four decades, and discuss significant episodes of productivity convergence 
by Korea, based on the UNIDO data. In Section Two, assessments of the major 
determinants of productivity will be made and their link to productivity change will be 
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examined. Section Three will present the mechanism of input-driven policies and 
productivity performance. A final section concludes the report. 
 
We will start with a set of UNIDO-provided data for Korea (total factor productivity and 
labor productivity levels at the aggregate and manufacturing sector levels for the time 
period 1960-2000). Then we will discuss the relationship between overall total 
productivity growth and the growth of average labor productivity at both the aggregate 
and the manufacturing sector levels. Since the UNIDO data set on total factor 
productivity is decomposed by efficiency change and technical change in both level index 
and percentage change, we may provide different interpretations of efficiency change and 
technical change. 
 
 
1.2   Objective of study 
 
This study aims to investigate productivity performance in Korea, with the growth of the 
overall economy as the main focus. The investigation is intended to analyse general 
factors as well as factors specific to Korea.  
 
   
1.3   Methodology 
 
Secondary data from official government documents have been used. In particular, 
comparative cross-country TFP data provided by UNIDO were used to discern trends. 
Primary data were generated through a limited sample survey to validate some of the 
assertions made. 
 
   
1.4   Organization of report 
 
In addition to this brief introduction, a description of growth and productivity trends is 
presented in the next section. Section three provides an assessment of the major 
determinants of productivity, while section four presents a discussion of policies affecting 
productivity in Korea. Section five, devoted to concluding remarks, completes the report. 
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II. Growth of the economy and productivity trends 
 
This section presents an analysis of the growth of the economy and productivity trends. 
The discussion starts with a brief account of GDP growth over the years. 
 
 
2.1   Record of GDP growth 
 
Growth performance 
 
According to estimates made by UNIDO, the overall productivity performance of Korea 
during the period of 1962-2000 can be summarized in terms of average annual growth 
rates in constant 1996 PPP as follows: 
 
GDP growth (DY) = 7.89% Capital deepening (DKL) = 8.43% 
Labor productivity growth (DLP) = 5.11% TFP growth (DTFP) = 0.43% 
Change in technical efficiency (DEFFCH) =0.28% Technical change (TECHCH) = 0.36% 
 
The estimates seem to be consistent with my own estimates from various sources of data, 
which is attached in the Appendix. From the UNIDO list of 15 developing countries, 
Korea recorded the highest growth rate (7.89%) of GDP in constant 1996 PPP prices. It 
recorded negative growth in 1980 (- 3.38%) after the second oil crisis and in 1998 (- 
8.21%) after the Asian financial crisis. Except for these two years, it succeeded in 
achieving a remarkably high growth for four decades. 
The decomposition of economy-wide aggregate growth accounting in per-capita terms 
can be made as follows: 
 
DLP (5.11%) = SK (0.55) × DKL (8.43%) + DTFP (0.43%)                                           (1) 
 
where SK is the average share of capital income in total GDP, which is imputed as 0.55 
(55%) from the estimates of DLP, DKL and DTFP, using the above identity. 
Alternatively, the decomposition of GDP growth can be made as follows: 
 
DY (7.89%) = SK (0.55) × DK (11.21%) + SL (0.45) × DL (2.78%) + DTFP (0.43%)  (2) 
 
where DK is the average growth rate of capital, SL is the average share of labor income in 
total GDP, and DL is the average growth rate of labor employment. From UNIDO 
estimates of DY, DLP and DKL, we have imputed DK and DL, using the following 
identity: 
 
DLP (5.11%) = DY (7.89%) – DL (2.78%)                                                                      (3) 
DKL (8.43%) = DK (11.21%) – DL (2.78%)                                                                   (4) 
 
Even though we have imputed shares of capital income and labor income from the 
UNIDO estimates of the rest of the variables in the identity of growth accounting as 
above, in principle there are two alternative ways of estimation. One way is to estimate 
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the average of the ratio of wages to value-added in the aggregate economy over the full 
period, and the other is to is to take the average of changing annual wage shares in the 
aggregate economy from the annual National Income Accounts statistics on gross 
national income and wages and salaries. However, both estimates of labor income will 
underestimate the contribution of labor input relative to capital input because it does not 
incorporate the contribution of farmers’ own labor and proprietors’ labor in the retail and 
wholesale sector etc. As a consequence, for the aggregate economy of Korea, where 
capital deepening has dominated the total factor input, the underestimation of the labor 
share (SL) and, therefore, the overestimation of the capital share (SK) tend to bias upward 
the contribution of total factor input and, accordingly, bias downward the contribution of 
total factor productivity. 
 
 
2.2  Comparison of results with those of other studies 
 
 
Manufacturing productivity growth 
 
On the other hand, we have made corresponding estimates in Korea’s-manufacturing 
sector during the period of 1964-2000 as follows: 
 
DLPM (8.24%) = SKM (0.46) × DKLM (8.35%) + DTFPM (4.40%)                             (5) 
 
where DLPM is the average annual growth rate of labor productivity in manufacturing; 
SKM is the share of capital income in manufacturing GDP; DKLM is the average annual 
growth rate of per capita capital in manufacturing; and DTFPM is the growth rate of total 
factor productivity in manufacturing. 
 
DYM(13.39%) = SKM(0.46)×DKM(13.67%)+SLM(0.54)×DLM(5.32%)+DTFPM(4.40%)      (6) 
 
where DYM is the average annual growth rate of real manufacturing GDP; DKM is the 
growth rate of capital stock in manufacturing; SLM is the average share of labor income 
in manufacturing; and DLM is the growth rate of labor input in manufacturing.  
  
The comparison of growth accounting between economy-wide aggregate  and the 
manufacturing sector reveals several characteristics in Korea’s productivity performance 
as follows: 
 
1) The growth accounting at the economy-wide aggregate level over the period of 
1962-2000 in Korea exhibited a capital-input-driven growth rather than TFP-led growth, 
confirming the Krugman (1994) proposition. The relative contribution of TFP growth to 
total GDP growth was only 5.5 percent. It also confirms Nadiri’s (1972) proposition that 
the relative contribution of TFP to output growth is small in developing economies as 
compared to its critical importance in industrialized economies. 
 
2) The manufacturing sector in Korea accumulated capital at a faster rate 
(11.21%) than the aggregate economy (8.43%), and increased employment, too, at a faster 
rate (5.32%) than the aggregate economy (2.78%). Its growth rate in capital deepening 
(8.35%) was almost the same as the economy-wide growth rate (8.43%). But the relative 
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contribution of TFP in manufacturing (32.9%) is much more significant than that at the 
aggregate economy-wide level (5.5%). Therefore, Korea’s rapid growth was 
manufacturing-led growth, and the significant contribution of its TFP seems to have 
exercised a spillover effect into other sectors such as the primary sector and the service 
sector, mitigating their lower TFP. 
 
3) The estimated share of labor income in manufacturing (0.54) was higher than 
that in the aggregate economy (0.45), due to higher rates of growth in employment, even 
though the average wage rate in manufacturing was lower than in the rest of the sectors. 
According to the Korea National Statistical Office, the industrial differences in wages 
were as follows in 1980 and 2000, where the index of manufacturing wage is treated as 
base index (100): 
 
Table 2.1 Index of industrial differences in wages 
                                                  1980            2000 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 138.4 110.8 
Mining 145.4 106.7 
Manufacturing 100.0 100.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water 179.5 153.9 
Construction 197.2 108.1 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants and Hotels 139.1 95.7 
Transport, Storage and Communication 136.9 111.8 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Service 170.6 121.7 
Community, Social and Personal services 187.4 105.3 
  Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Social Indicators in Korea, 2001 
 
The wage differential between manufacturing and non-manufacturing was reduced from 
1980 (100: 161.8) to 2000 (100: 114.2). There was a significant catch-up in the level of 
manufacturing wages to non-manufacturing wages due to the changes to a productivity-
based compensation policy, strong union activity in manufacturing, and an increase in 
skill-intensity in manufacturing labor. 
 
The overall productivity trends at both the aggregate economy-wide level and the 
manufacturing level seem to suggest that the growth of TFP may not seem significant in 
the aggregate sense but that it played a crucial role indirectly through lifting up the 
productivity of the manufacturing sector.  
   
  
Technical change and technical efficiency 
 
UNIDO has applied Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to obtain the change in technical 
efficiency and technical change, and the Malmquist index to obtain TFP growth. It is 
argued that the advantage of this method is that it does not assume any functional form, 
and no assumptions about perfect competition, profit maximization, etc. are needed. It is 
further argued that, technically, DEA involves the use of linear programming methods to 
construct a non-parametric piece-wise frontier (or surface in the case of several outputs). 
                                                                                                                                        5 
Productivity performance 
From UNIDO estimates of TFP growth (DTFP) for the Republic of Korea (1962-2000), 
we calculated the average TFP growth rate of 0.43 percent, which confirms UNIDO 
estimate of DTFP in equations (1) and (2). In addition, both Korea’s average change in 
technical efficiency (DEFFCH) and average change in technical change (TECHCH) are 
estimated to be 0.28 percent and 0.36 percent respectively. The picture might have been 
quite different if we had the corresponding estimates in manufacturing because the 
relative contribution of TFP in the sector (32.9%) was a lot bigger than that in the 
aggregate economy. Therefore, the magnitudes of both change in technical efficiency and 
change in technical change must have been bigger in manufacturing than those in the 
aggregate economy. 
 
Now it is apparent that, in the case of Korea, the overall productivity gain was driven by 
the manufacturing sector and the sector’s growth was driven not only by the fast 
accumulation of rival inputs (capital and labor), which accounted for two-thirds of the 
manufacturing GDP growth, but also by the growth of TFP, which accounted for the 
remaining one-third of the manufacturing growth.  
 
In summary, we can argue that, in the case of Korea, the growth of TFP may not seem 
significant in the aggregate sense but it played a crucial role indirectly through lifting up 
the productivity of the manufacturing sector. In particular, the growth in technical 
efficiency and technical change in the manufacturing sector must have worked in two 
directions to lift up productivity in the rest of the sectors: one is a direct effect on 
manufactures-user industries and the other is an indirect effect of spillover and learning-
by-doing. For example, computer manufacturing and assembly causes a lifting up of the 
productivity of computer-using service industries, and computer manufacturing itself 
generates a spillover effect and induces learning-by-doing by other industries’ manpower.  
 
 
Productivity convergence 
 
The data provided by UNIDO indicates the following convergence of Korea’s labor 
productivity relative to the US: 
 
Korea’s labor productivity relative to the US, 1961: 15.27 
Korea’s labor productivity relative to the US, 2000: 48.40 
 
It provides an episode of rapid productivity convergence: Korea’s per-capita income in 
1961 was about 15.27 percent of US per-capita income, but it reached the level of 48.4 
percent of US per-capita income over four decades. As pointed out by Lucas (1993), we 
need a growth theory that incorporates the possibility of rapid-growth episodes and 
productivity convergence. 
 
No single theory could explain this episode because it involves more than the growth of 
an aggregate economy; it should deal with the complex story of development with late 
industrialization. It would be tempting to say that everything the Korean Government did 
was appropriate and timely and that the interaction between government and market in 
Korea was well coordinated. However, a careful examination of the past development 
history of Korea reveals that there were pros and cons and ups and downs and that the 
episode of fast growth was far from smooth. The Korean economy had to go through very 
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turbulent periods, as witnessed in 1980-1981 following the second oil crisis and the 
assassination of President Park, and in 1997-1998 in the middle of Asian financial crisis. 
In what follows, I advance a set of propositions and hypotheses that may provide us with 
not a single theory or episode but multiples of them together, with which we could 
possibly lay out analytic narratives for Korea’s fast productivity convergence. I will do so 
by following the three chronological stages of Korean development. 
              
(1) Reconstruction and import substitution (1953-1961) 
In order to set the first stage in the right perspective, it seems necessary to briefly 
overview the Korean economy after the Korean War. The period of 1953-1961 can be 
called the Reconstruction Period. As a consequence of a devastating war, which lasted 
three years, the magnitude of war destruction was immense. According to Lee (2001), in 
the agricultural sector total land that could be used for production was damaged by 27.4 
percent and the rice harvest declined by 40 percent from 1948. The magnitude of 
destruction in the industrial sector is estimated to be about 60 percent on average. In 
particular, the destruction of light manufacturing facilities worsened the shortage of basic 
industrial products such as food, clothing and other basic necessities. 
 
It was a period in which the Korean government relied heavily on foreign aid to stabilize 
the domestic economy and carry out a minimum reconstruction investment. During the 
period, total foreign aid -occupied 71.3 percent of total imports and was used to purchase 
raw materials, semi-manufactured intermediate goods, and machinery and equipment for 
private sectors. The government allocated its foreign reserves to finance an extra portion 
of imports. 
 
Since it was a period when the Korean government used foreign aid to finance the current 
account deficit and to support the defense budget (34.8%) and fiscal investment and 
finance (64.2%), the utmost importance was given to restricting imports and promoting 
import substitution. The direct subsidy policy for exports was almost non-existent until 
1961. During the period, the allocation of foreign exchange was centrally controlled by 
the Bank of Korea and both quantitative import restriction and tariff policy were 
administered to save foreign exchange and promote import substitution. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry announced bi-annually from 1955 the list of import items subject 
to three categories: 1) automatic approval items 2) restricted items and 3) prohibited items. 
The representative import substitutes such as cotton fabric and wheat flour and milling 
products, were prohibited from being imported from 1955. The tariff structure was a 
typical escalation system: basic necessities in shortage and non-producible products 
(10%); domestically-produced unfinished products (20%); domestically-non-producible 
finished products (30%); domestically-produced finished products (40%); semi-luxury 
goods (50-90%); and luxury goods (over 100%). The average tariff rate by 1957 was 40 
percent. 
 
During this period of 1953-1961, the foreign aid total reached US$2,284.6 million. The 
largest source was the US ICA (International Cooperation Administration) and its 
successor, AID (Agency for International Development) with US$1,743.7 million 
(76.3%), and the second and the third largest sources were CRIK and US PL (Public 
Law) 480 with US$218 million (9.5%) and US$202.7 million (8.9%) respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                        7 
Productivity performance 
On the fiscal side, the fiscal revenue in 1961 was mostly decomposed by foreign aid 
(39.6%) and tax revenue (38.2%). The fiscal expenditure in 1961 was decomposed by 
general operating expenditure (41.3%), fiscal investment and finance (29.7%) and defense 
expenditure (29.0%). The fiscal investments in 1959 were decomposed by import of 
investment goods (36.6%), agriculture (22.2%), and public construction (17.9%). On the 
other hand, fiscal financing was decomposed by category: General Industrial Fund 
(68.2%) mostly administered through the Korea Development Bank, the Water 
Management and Agriculture Fund (21.2%) administered by the Korea Agricultural Bank, 
the Small and Medium Enterprise Loan (5.9%), the Housing Loan (3.9%) and the Export 
Promotion Loan (0.8%). 
 
Lastly, on the financial policy side it was the period in which there was always excess 
demand for loans. While the bank interest rate was put at a ceiling of 20 percent, the 
unsecured private curb-market rate was in the range of 48-120 percent. In particular, the 
interest rate charged by the Korea Development Bank was lower than other commercial 
banks’ lending rate. The Korea Development Bank’s loan occupied 40 percent of entire 
bank loans and 70 percent of total equipment loans. The share of manufacturing loans in 
total KDB loans increased from 37 percent in 1954 to 64 percent in 1960. It was mostly 
financed to import-substitution industries such as textiles, fertilizer, cotton and yarn, 
wheat flours and sugar etc. 
 
Table 2.2 Principal economic indicators 
Savings Rate 
Year GNP (million US$) 
GDP per 
Capita 
(US$) 
Investment 
Rate Domestic Foreign 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
1953 1,353 67 15.4 8.8 6.6 - - 
1954 1,452 70 11.9 6.6 5.3 31.8 5.1 
1955 1,395 65 12.3 5.2 7.1 62.1 4.5 
1956 1,450 66 8.9 -1.9 10.9 34.0 -1.4 
1957 1,666 74 15.3 5.5 9.8 22.2 7.6 
1958 1,875 80 12.9 4.9 8.0 -1.3 5.5 
1959 1,949 81 11.1 4.2 6.9 1.3 3.8 
1960 1,948 80 10.9 0.8 8.6 11.7 1.1 
1961 2,103 82 13.2 2.9 8.6 14.0 5.6 
Average   12.4 4.1 6.7 22.0 - 
Source: Korea Development Institute (1991b: 475) 
 
(2) The first stage (1962-1976)  
The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan was originally drafted at the end of the 
Rhee government, but it was revised and implemented by the Park government. The first 
feature of the first plan was to promote basic industries such as steel and cement to help 
build infrastructure and, therefore, had an element of import substitution policy. Pohang 
Steel Co. Ltd was established as a public enterprise, but cement companies were 
established by private firms who were awarded project loans from industrial banks. So 
there was mixture of public enterprises and private firms who were commissioned to 
carry out the projects.  
 
The second feature of the first plan was the promotion of light manufacturing industries 
which could produce labor-intensive products and could export to overseas markets. 
Plywood, garments, and the simple assembly of electronics and wigs were the main 
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products, and most production was left to private industries. Typically, the General 
Trading Companies (GTC) of major conglomerates known as Chaebol, played the role of 
subcontracting export orders to smaller domestic firms, financing them through export 
financing or the domestic credit system by guaranteeing their loans to domestic banks, 
and marketing their products in the export market. The public enterprises and private 
firms started absorbing the labor force, and the shortage of labor force in manufacturing 
induced rural-urban migration. Korea seemed to have passed the Lewisian turning point 
by 1974-1975 after passing the take-off stage in the late 1960s. 
 
The government adopted an implicit rule of game or at times an explicit decree or 
announcement or set of directives and regulations that announced “Export Priority”. At 
the time of launching the first plan there was internal debate between bureaucrats and 
scholars about the mode of development financing. It happened to coincide with the 
Korea-Japan Agreement on normalizing the bilateral relationship, and Japanese grants 
and aids were negotiated.  
 
In general, it was a period when the nationalistic movement was very strong. The foreign 
direct investments did not receive much credit due to strong anti-Japanese sentiment and 
the Park government therefore opted for inducing project loans from the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank, and using them for basic industries such as steel 
and cement and for social infrastructure such as highways and railroads and power plants, 
etc. Most private projects were awarded to private firms, usually to qualified 
conglomerates through the Korea Development Bank, the Korea Export Import Bank, the 
Korea Medium and Small Enterprise Bank, and other commercial banks, through 
syndicated loans or government-subsidized policy loans. For getting next-round loans, 
one of the most important criteria was export performance by the loan-awarded 
companies.  
 
Both the government and banks monitored the companies’ performance. This criterion of 
export-performance exercised a constant pressure on private firms and their owners and 
entrepreneurs so that they were almost obsessed with how to sell their products in the 
overseas market. Even though there must have been a lot of distortion effect, the explicit 
criterion of export priority reduced the arbitrariness by bureaucrats and bankers and made 
the monitoring system relatively more transparent than that under the import-substitution 
system. 
 
The First Five-Year Development period (1962-1966) can be characterized as a period of 
explosive export growth. As shown in Appendix Table A3-1, the export amount in 
current US dollars increased from US$54.8 million in 1962 to US$253.7 million, or by 
about five times. Helped by an extraordinary export performance, the annual average 
GDP growth rate by 8.5 percent, exceeding the target rate (7.1%). 
 
The growth momentum that was built up under the First Five-Year Development Plan 
was carried over to two consecutive Five-Year Development Plans until 1976, despite the 
first oil crisis in 1974. The actual GDP growth rates in the Second (9.7%) and the Third 
Five-Year Development Plans (10.1%) exceeded target rates (7.0% and 8.6% 
respectively). By end of the First Stage in 1976, exports (US$7,815 million) were not far 
off imports (US$8,405 million). During the first stage the domestic savings rate increased 
from 0.8 percent in 1962 to 23.1 percent in 1976, which was instrumental to Korea’s 
productivity convergence. Industrial structure transformed from the primary (33.4%), the 
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secondary (21.7%), and the tertiary (44.9%) in 1962 to the primary (24.0%), the 
secondary (29.5%), and the tertiary (46.5%) in 1976. 
 
In summary, it was a truly remarkable export-led and manufacturing-oriented extensive 
growth, which has achieved the productivity convergence at an unprecedented speed. 
  
 
(3) The second stage (1975-1987) 
While the first stage (1962-1976) of Korean development was characterized by the rural-
urban migration and the inter-industry transformation from the primary sector to the light-
manufacturing sector, the second stage (1975-1986) can be described as a period of intra-
manufacturing transformation from labor-intensive industries to capital- and technology-
intensive industries. The quadrupled oil prices in the 1974 oil crisis and the increasing 
wage rate after passing the Lewisian turning point when the period of unlimited supply of 
labor was over, forced the Korean government and private firms to look for alternative 
industries and product lines for more value-added. GTC-based conglomerates started 
looking for opportunities to invest in automobiles, shipbuilding, petroleum and chemical 
industries, and metals and industrial-machinery industries. But since some of these 
industries were more import-substituting industries than export-promoting industries, the 
monitoring system became less transparent.  
 
In the early 1980s, the Korean economy experienced the second oil crisis and had to go 
through restructuring the investments in heavy and chemical industries made during the 
late 1970s. But it was in this period that major conglomerates such as Samsung, Lucky 
Goldstar (LG) and Hyundai started investing in semi-conductor industries because they 
anticipated the technology frontier in that industry and the government wanted to promote 
competition in the industry as outlined in Pyo (2000). During this period the Korean 
government moved from a direct industrial-support policy to an indirect support policy. 
For example, they tried to shift the paradigm of industrial promotion from directly 
subsidizing an industry such as steel or automobile to indirectly promoting investments in 
energy saving, preserving the environment, and introducing new technologies through 
enhanced R&D programs. It  was also a period in which trade liberalization before capital 
market opening was seriously deliberated as a backdrop against rising wages and trade 
unionism, as discussed in Pyo (1990). 
 
During the second stage, the performance of GDP growth was mixed between the Fourth 
Plan period (5.5% annual average below the target rate of 9.2%) and the Fifth Plan period 
(8.4% annual average above the target rate of 7.6%). We also note an excessive 
investment drive during the Fourth Plan period in which the actual investment rate 
(35.5%) exceeded the planned rate (26.2%) by a large margin. This excessive over-
investment was combined with the second oil crisis and the assassination of President 
Park in late 1979 and the subsequent political instability in 1980, making the Korean 
economy experience a negative growth (- 6.2%) in that year for the first time since 1962. 
By the end of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan in 1986, the Korean government had 
stopped drafting Five-Year Development Plans and had moved toward a sort of indicative 
planning with annual projection and mid-term projection of three years or so. 
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(4) The third stage (1987-2000) 
The third stage (1987-2000) is characterized by a turbulent transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a more democratic one. It was a period in which Korea pursued 
import liberalization and capital market opening by joining the WTO and the OECD. It 
was a period when Korean conglomerates engaged in excess competition in a pattern of 
monopolistic competition across industries. Many of them invested in pre-emptive 
investment projects in non-tradable sectors to stay alive against increasing foreign and 
domestic competition.  
 
The monitoring system by both government and banks became less transparent, and a lax 
financial supervision created a vast network of moral hazard. It was also a period of 
rapidly declining rates of return on capital in Korea, as observed in Pyo and Nam (1998). 
As the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF described it, the Korean financial crisis 
of 1997 was a twin crisis: a foreign exchange crisis and a domestic credit crunch. During 
the post-crisis IMF programs, there was both corporate and financial restructuring, and 
about two-thirds of the top 30 conglomerates went bankrupt. But toward the end of this 
stage, the Korean economy was affected by the New Economy and the IT revolution. 
There was substitution of investments from conventional non-IT sectors to IT sectors, but 
the employment absorption by IT sectors was rather weak and, once the IT boom was 
over by 1999, the investment became quite stagnant, casting doubt on new sources of 
sustainable growth for the Korean economy. 
 
 
An episode of rapid productivity convergence 
 
So far we have reviewed productivity change in Korea and its fast productivity 
convergence mostly in quantitative terms with historical perspectives. Lucas (1993) has 
suggested that we need a theory that incorporates the possibility of rapid growth episodes 
and that such theory should be able to explain why Korea experienced rapid growth since 
the mid-1960s while the Philippines experienced no such growth, although both 
economies started from roughly similar socio-economic conditions. Since then, multiple 
theories of new growth have followed, but they seem to have emphasized only a 
particular aspect (for example, externality, human capital, learning-by-doing or the 
threshold aspect) and not multiple significant aspects of growth. 
 
In what follows, I attempt to provide not another new growth theory but rather significant 
episodes of productivity change and rapid productivity convergence, based on 
observations of Korea during the last four decades. In theoretical terms, no single growth 
or development theory can explain such episodes, but a combination of new 
institutionalists’ views and neoclassical models of trade and growth can provide 
theoretical conjectures. 
 
My explanation of significant episodes is based on two key phrases: ‘potential initial 
conditions’ and ‘structural change and transformation’. By ‘potential initial conditions’, I 
mean that we need to identify the state of initial conditions of the country not only by 
visible and quantifiable indicators but also by often-hidden indicators. These hidden 
indicators are so-called deep determinants (Rodrik et al., 2002), typically of a social, 
religious and political nature. Among the potential initial conditions, I argue that 
historical heritages, which are often embodied in institutions and commercial practices, 
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are the most important determinant because they ultimately shape policy environments 
and determine the success or failure of later development programs. 
 
In the case of Korea, I can single out three such initial conditions among hundreds of 
potential conditions. The first is a colonial heritage that the primary school enrollment 
ratio was once increased from less than 5 percent to 30 percent in the 1930s. The second 
is the episode of an early land reform after independence before interest groups could be 
formed and allied. The third is the expansion of primary education in the mid-1950s 
under the influence of the American mass-education system. The first and the third 
elements combined formed the basis of what I define as the two-tier system of human 
capital, which is a unique historical heritage of Korea. 
 
Even though Lucas (1993) has observed that both the Philippines and South Korea started 
from “roughly similar socio-economic conditions”, the potential initial conditions were 
quite different between the two economies in the early 1960s. First, while there was an 
extensive agricultural land reform in Korea as of March 25, 1950, five years after its 
independence from Japan in 1945, there was almost no significant agricultural land 
reform in the Philippines. While there was almost no large landlord class as a ruling class 
in Korea, there were large agricultural oligarchies in the Philippines. Second, there 
existed a significant difference in the state of income distribution between the two 
economies. According to the World Bank, Social Indicators of Development 1988, the 
income received by the highest 10% of households in the Philippines was 40% (1965) and 
39% (1975), while that in Korea was 28% (1975). In terms of primary school enrollment 
rates, the two economies were identical, at near 100%, by 1965. But the enrollment rates 
of secondary and tertiary schools began to diverge from the 1970s. In the Philippines, the 
secondary school enrollment rate improved from 46% in 1970 to 73% in 1990, and the 
tertiary school enrollment rate increased from 3% to 27%. On the other hand, in the 
Republic of Korea, the two rates improved at much faster rates, from 42% to 87% and 
from 16% to 39% respectively. 
 
The second key element in explaining significant episodes of productivity change and 
convergence in Korea is the social capacity to transform from an agriculture-based 
economy to a manufacturing one at an earlier stage and from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to capital-intensive and technology-intensive manufacturing industries at 
later stages. Such a social capacity could exist as just a potential capacity and could never 
materialize in many developing countries, unless some kind of development shock comes 
through. Naturally, this is the reason why the role of government is important because it 
can generate domestically a development shock, or absorb a foreign shock and internalize 
it into a domestic one. For example, on May 16, 1961, a military coup staged by President 
Park generated a domestic development shock because the military group had to build 
their own legitimacy by providing the public with blueprints of economic development. 
On the other hand, the sudden reduction of US aid in early 1960s caused economic 
hardship but generated an external shock which made the Korean people aware of the fact 
that they could not live on foreign aid forever and, therefore, they needed their own 
indigenous effort in rebuilding the national economy. 
 
As reviewed before, Korea was basically an agricultural economy by the early 1960s. 
According to my long-run database of Korea (Pyo, 2001), the share of the primary sector 
(agriculture, fishery and forestry) in total value added has changed: 62.6% (1911), 47.1% 
(1938), 40.4% (1953) and 41.1% (1961). The share of the primary sector in total 
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employment is estimated to have changed: 87.4% (1911), 82.5% (1938), 70.4% (1953) 
and 64.2% (1961). 
 
The episode of productivity change was begun by a concerted effort by the government 
and the private sector. After the Rhee government was toppled by student demonstrations 
on April 19, 1960, a weak cabinet government was formed, but economic and political 
instability followed until President Park consolidated power through a military coup on 
May 16, 1961. The Park government was very weak in legitimacy and, therefore, had to 
establish themselves by solving the nation’s economic hardship and eliminating poverty. 
They announced a series of economic stabilization measures including the freezing of 
high-interest loans to farmers and fishery households on May 25, 1961. By this measure, 
farmers and fishers were supposed to pay back their loans to the National Agricultural 
Cooperative Federation (public bank) at a reduced annual interest rate (12%) over an 
extended period of time (5 years). In turn, the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation issued an Agriculture Finance Bond to lenders, who were supposed to be paid 
back at a 20% annual interest rate over a four-year-period after a one-year grace period. 
Under this measure, a total of 53.7 billion Hwan was registered as high-interest loans and 
29.6 billion Hwan was ruled as eligible loans, and 23.7 billion Hwan was paid back 
through the bond. Since, at the time, farmers and fishers were trapped by high-interest (at 
times over 40%) on curb-market loans which they had incurred as operating expenses and 
child education fees, etc., the measure was taken as a significant relief to them, and 
became instrumental in their mobility to the manufacturing sector. 
 
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established in July 1961 as an up-scaled 
Ministry independent of the Ministry of Finance, specializing in drafting and 
administering economic development plans, and it was also given budgeting power and a 
supervisory role over public enterprises. The Deputy Prime Minister was appointed to 
head the EPB, and the planning and implementation of economic development plan was 
centralized. The EPB drafted the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (FEDP) by 
the end of 1961, and announced it on January 5, 1962. Under the plan, two types of 
industries were chosen as strategic industries. One was the labor-intensive manufacturing 
sector such as plywood, wigs, simple assembly of home electronics and textile & apparel, 
which have the best potential for exports. The other was the  basic industries for 
constructing infrastructure and providing basic materials for other industries such as steel 
& iron, cement, and electric power plants, etc., which are import-substitutes. 
 
During the First (1962-1966) and Second Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1967-
1971), the industrial restructuring took the form of inter-industry transformation, mostly 
migration from agriculture, forestry and fishery to mining and manufacturing and services. 
When the first oil crisis shocked the country in 1974, the Korean government started 
realizing that exports of simple assembled manufactures may become no longer viable. In 
addition to material and intermediate product cost-inflation due to quadrupled oil prices, 
there was a substantial wage increase as the Korean economy passed the Lewisian turning 
point around 1975, ending a period of unlimited labor supply. 
 
According to Nurkse (1961), if the source of growth of an economy lies in the growth of a 
factor, one of the most important tasks is to allocate that factor to the industries with 
“incremental comparative advantage”. Nurkse (1961, P.308) made a distinction between 
“established” and “incremental” comparative advantage, which becomes necessary as 
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soon as we apply the central concept of international trade theory to the problem of 
economic growth.  
 
After distinguishing between two types of industrialization, export promotion of 
manufactured goods to industrial countries and production for domestic markets, he then 
argued:  
 
“It is to make use of growing resources which cannot with comparative advantage be 
absorbed by expansion in the traditional sectors that industrialization becomes really 
necessary. We therefore envisage industrial activities, whether for export or for home use, 
as being set up on top of the existing export sectors, so long as in these sectors a country 
still enjoys a high “established” comparative advantage even though, as a consequence 
of sluggish expansion of external demand, its “incremental “ comparative advantage in 
these lines may be low.” 
 
In other words, it is necessary to view comparative advantage in a dynamic setting for a 
development strategy based on export promotion through industrialization. In the case of 
Korea, the inter-industry transformation in the form of migration from traditional sector 
to manufacturing took place during the period of 1962-1974. Then it was substituted by 
intra-manufacturing transformation and restructuring during the period of 1975-1979 
from unskilled-labor-intensive industries to skilled-labor-intensive industries and more 
capital-intensive industries. This restructuring was provoked by the first oil crisis in 1973-
74. 
 
The second restructuring was carried out mainly during the 1980s in order to rectify some 
of the investments which were ill conceived or mismanaged. After President Park was 
assassinated in October 1979, there was a brief period of political instability and also the 
second oil crisis in 1980 followed. The growth rate of real GDP dropped from 9.3 percent 
in 1978 and 6.8 percent in 1979 to –1.5 percent in 1980. The regime of President Chun, 
coming from a military background, also had to seek political legitimacy by improving 
economic conditions. One of President Chun’s policy doctrines was to follow President 
Park’s principle of keeping economic policies independent of political and military 
influence. Most of the major economic policy decisions were left to expert bureaucrats, 
who decided that there was a need to carry out a major industrial restructuring and reduce 
foreign debt.  
 
During the period of 1975-79, some of the conglomerates carried out pre-emptive 
investments in heavy and chemical industries such as automobile, shipbuilding, cement, 
iron and steel, and in refinery and petrochemical industries, following the government 
policy direction to restructure the economy from light industries to heavy and chemical 
industries. Many of such projects became white elephants in the early 1980s, and were no 
longer viable. Some of the major conglomerates had to give up several projects, and 
consolidation of excessive investment became inevitable. The government initiated 
restructuring through government-controlled banks such as the Korea Development Bank, 
which had provided loans to major heavy and chemical industries projects. 
 
During the period of the 1980s there were some important policy shifts to help restructure 
the economy. The first shift was to promote technology-intensive industries after learning 
lessons from over-investing in heavy and chemical capital-intensive industries. From the 
early 1980s, Samsung entered into semi-conductor investments, and Lucky-Goldstar (LG) 
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and Hyundai followed Samsung. The second shift was made by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI), which changed industrial support policy from a direct 
support system to an indirect support system. For example, in the 1970s MCI tried to 
identify the so-called strategic export sector and promoted the industry by providing 
various incentive tax-cum-subsidy systems  
 
and easy access to loans from government controlled banks. But in the 1980s, the direct 
support system was slowly replaced by an indirect support system. For example, there 
was an R&D support system and an investment tax credit system for investments in 
energy-saving machinery and equipments and facilities. The third shift was to move 
toward import liberalization in commodity markets, as documented in Pyo (1990). The 
trade liberalization effort in the 1980s provided a significant incentive for industrial 
restructuring by reducing inflationary pressure and, therefore, reducing financial 
distortion which existed in the form of the gap between the official bank lending rate and 
the unofficial curb-market rate. 
 
The third industrial restructuring was made as a consequence of the IMF bailout measure 
after the December 1977 financial crisis. As documented in IMF (2003), it was basically a 
twin-crisis: a combination of domestic banking crisis and foreign exchange crisis. Under 
the system of IMF mandated bailout, Korean industries had to go through a massive 
restructuring. As I have outlined in Pyo (2004), in 1997 there were thirteen Chaebols out 
of the top thirty Chaebols that went under court-supervised restructuring. The 
fundamental cause of the 1997 crisis in Korea was pre-emptive over-investments by 
major conglomerates while there was a significant reduction in rates of return. As I 
defined in Pyo (2000), it was the failure of the excess competition model as a 
consequence of unchecked financial liberalization and lax bank supervision. 
 
The excess competition occurred not because chaebols were not interested in profits but 
because they began to realize that their protected market and regulatory regime was being 
threatened by the change in political economy between the government and chaebols and 
by increased foreign competition through full-scale trade and financial liberalization by 
Korea’s accession to the WTO and the OECD. The change in the political economy was 
inevitable because Korea was going through a very turbulent period of democratization in 
transition from the quasi-military authoritarian regimes of Presidents Chun (1981-1987) 
and Roh (1988-1992) to the truly civilian government of President Kim (1993-1997). The 
transition implied a transformation from a strong government to a weaker government. In 
other words, the alliance between the government and big business through the exchange 
of political contributions and favoritism was weakened, creating an environment where 
chaebols were no longer well protected in their respective markets. And the impending 
foreign competition accentuated this trend and made many conglomerates impatient and 
nervous, and caused them to over-react or over-invest recklessly. 
 
The industrial restructuring after 1998 took the form of M&A and big deals among 
troubled major conglomerates. In addition, as the IT boom followed after the financial 
crisis, Korean industries invested in the IT sector and venture capital. But investment 
stagnation followed, and the long-run prospect of productivity growth is therefore quite 
uncertain at this point. After a massive restructuring in the form of cuts in employment 
and working hours, labor productivity has improved but the overall gain in total factor 
productivity is not observed yet. But the recovery after the crisis was made possible by 
some productivity gain through industrial restructuring under IMF- mandated programs. 
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In summary, the episode of rapid productivity convergence in Korea was made possible 
by the successful adoption of a development strategy based on incremental comparative 
advantage and industrial restructuring on the initiative of the government. It was a 
consequence of interaction between market forces and government intervention.   
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III.   Assessment of the major determinants of productivity 
 
 
3.1   Reflections 
 
The fruits of knowledge, which are frequently hidden and intangible by their nature, have 
been important determinants of Korea’s productivity growth. The stock of knowledge at 
the beginning stage of development plans was so shallow that it did not reach the 
threshold level where externality can be put into effect. 
 
 
3.2   Technology issues  
 
As in many developing countries, Korea relied on imported foreign technology to carry 
out the construction and operation of major manufacturing facilities. At the beginning 
stage, the imported technology came in the form of machines and equipments, mostly 
from the United States and Japan. The operation manuals by the Japanese producers 
could be easily interpreted because there were many senior engineers who had been 
trained in the colonial period. One of the reasons why the Japanese machines and 
equipments were popular at the beginning stage of development was this familiarity with 
the system and know-how. Another reason was easy access to after-sales service because 
of the proximity to Japan. As the engineers and scientists who were trained in the late 
1950s and 1960s in the United States started returning home in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
their familiarity with US machines and equipments slowly led to the replacement of 
Japanese machines and equipments with US machines and equipments. 
 
R&D and technology imports are two important windows of technology adoption in many 
developing countries. But the success of late industrialization ultimately depends on the 
country’s indigenous technological capacity to absorb new technologies at the right time. 
In general, technology buyers in developing countries are given multiple choices of 
different technologies by technology sellers in advanced countries for a given plant 
construction or processing know-how. Usually, the choice of the right technology at the 
right price and at the right time is the most crucial part of the success of the project. 
Without indigenous technological capacity, industries in developing countries cannot 
make the optimal choice of technology. 
 
In the case of Korea, this role of choosing the right technology at the right time was left to 
entrepreneurs and engineers, not to bureaucrats. Most engineers were foreign-educated, 
and consulted domestic R&D centers to acquire knowledge of the technology in question. 
In other words, the indigenous technological capacity was itself a human capital. 
 
Even though it is difficult to identify statistically the growth of indigenous technological 
capacity, the patent statistics can provide us with one source of indicators. According to 
statistics compiled by the Korea Patent Office, the number of patent applications 
increased exponentially from 1948 (169 cases) to 1960 (611 cases), 1980 (5,070 cases) 
and 1997 (92,734 cases). The composition by applicant’s nationality is as follows: 1948 
(Korean 100%), 1960 (Korean 89.2%, USA 2.7%, West Germany 1.6%), 1980 (Korean 
24.5%, USA 22.7%, Japan 32.0%), and 1997 (Korean 72.6%, USA 7.9%, Japan 12.0%,  
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Germany 2.5%). In summary, Japan and the United States were the two dominant foreign 
patent applicants, but the Korean share, which once declined to the level of 24.5% in 
1980, was kept up at over 70% in the mid-1990s. This is one indication of indigenous 
technology build-up.  
 
There are two additional indicators for the development of indigenous technological 
capacity. One is the status of national technical certificates, and the other is the status of 
vocational training. According to the Ministry of Labor‘s Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 
total national technical certificate holders increased from 122,833 persons in 1978 to 
541,544 persons in 2000. The composition in 1978 by kinds of national certificates was 
craftsman (54.8%), industrial engineer (24.6%), assistant craftsman (11.9%), engineer 
(8.5%), and professional engineer (0.3%). It changed in 2000 to craftsman (78.0%), 
industrial engineer (10.2%), assistant craftsman (2.2%), engineer (9.0%), professional 
engineer (0.4%), and master craftsman (0.1%). This indicates that, while professional 
engineers and engineers certificate holders have not increased much in recent years 
because the market demand for their service is limited, the supply of craftsman certificate 
holders has increased significantly, both in numbers and in shares. 
 
 
Research and development 
 
One of the maintained hypotheses that I would propose is that the main R&D activities in 
Korea were pioneered by the first generation of scientists and engineers who were 
educated and trained in the United States and Europe. They include the founding 
members of KAIST and the Korea Defense Research Institute, etc. Since, at that time, 
private firms’ R&D facilities were fragile and often lacked the right equipment, and 
facilities and financial compensations were also low, the bulk of major scientists and 
engineers therefore preferred the government think tanks. It was only in the 1990s that the 
prestigious private R&D centers run by major conglomerates could offer better salaries 
and non-salary remunerations. 
 
R&D activities at both government and private sector level need to be assessed. In general, 
R&D expenditure can be decomposed into two categories: public R&D and private R&D. 
In the case of Korea, the role of public R&D was dominant at the beginning of its 
development plan in the 1960s. However, public R&D could not satisfy the technology 
and engineering demand from private firms as the industrial structure was transformed 
from light industries to heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s. The private R&D, 
which was motivated by various tax incentives by the government, was oriented toward 
more application and adaptation technologies and engineering know-how. Therefore, 
there seems to have been a complementary relationship between public R&D and private 
R&D in Korea during the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
On the other hand, the role of private R&D started to dominate public R&D in Korea 
from the mid-1980s when Korea’s industrial policy shifted from direct industry-specific 
support policy to indirect functional support policy. It was also the time when major 
Korean conglomerates started investing in semi-conductors, higher-value-added steel and 
metal products, and machinery and equipments, including automobiles. In the 1990s, 
public R&D played an important role in the telecommunication industries: ETRI 
(Electronic Telecommunication Research Institute) and KISDI (Korean Information 
 18 
Republic of Korea 
Society Development Institute) are representative examples. And public R&D and private 
R&D started with not only complementary elements but also competitive elements. 
 
The differential role of public R&D and private R&D in the evolution of Korea’s R&D 
policy needs to be carefully examined, and its relationship with productivity performance 
in key sectors should be evaluated. For example, according to the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, the R&D 
expenditure on Information and Telecommunication took 20 percent of total R&D 
expenditure and 0.39 percent of GDP in 1991, but increased by the year 2000 to 49.2 
percent and 1.32 percent respectively. The sector’s R&D expenditure was decomposed 
between public and private by a ratio of 18 percent and 82 percent respectively in 1991, 
but changed to a ratio of 10 percent and 90 percent in 2000. 
 
Overall, R&D expenditure shows a remarkable upward trend, both in terms of the 
absolute amount being put in and the relative share of GDP as shown in the Appendix 
Table A4. The total expenditure increased from 1.2 billion Won (0.24% of GDP) in 1963 
to 13,848 billion Won (2.67% of GDP) in 2000. The sustained productivity growth was 
made possible by building up the country’s own indigenous technological capacity 
through a division of work between public R&D and private R&D. 
 
The number of R&D institutes increased from 72 in 1963 to 2,856 in 1996, and R&D 
manpower increased from 1,750 persons to 132,023 persons during the same period. In 
1996, 11.7 percent of R&D manpower was with research institutes, 34.3 percent was with 
universities, and the remaining 54 percent was with private firms. The decomposition of 
R&D expenditure by function shows: basic R&D (18.2%), applied R&D (28.9%) and 
product development (53.0%) in 1983, and basic R&D (12.6%), applied R&D (24.3%) 
and product development (63.1%) in 2000 as shown in the Appendix Table A4. In recent 
years, the relative weight of R&D expenditure in product development has become larger 
than basic or applied R&D. This indicates that private R&D expenditure has become 
more important than public R&D, and that Korea’s R&D has become a more 
commercially-oriented expenditure. 
 
 Technology transfer 
 
Regarding technology import policy, Korea adopted the promotion of R&D and 
technology imports as a prime policy to enhance productivity increase which can be 
linked to a good export performance. Korea’s development strategy from the very 
beginning of the 1960s aimed at inducing syndicate loans from the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, and commercial banks, and then reallocating them to project-
qualified companies through government-controlled banks such as the Korea 
Development Bank, the Korea Small and Medium Enterprise Bank, the Korea Export and 
Import Bank, etc. Therefore, the role of direct foreign investment was relatively 
insignificant, which was different from the development strategies of Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan.  
 
Under this system, the project-awarded qualified companies had to meet the government 
standard of export performance and cost-benefit requirements by substantially improving 
productivity performance. They had relatively little time for endogenous R&D effort, and 
had to rely on imported technology. Most imported technology was in the form of 
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imported know-how and manuals which come with the purchase of imported machinery 
and equipments. Later on, most imported technologies were in the form of purchased 
licensing agreements and intellectual property rights. But most firms had to invest in a 
minimum of R&D in order to build their own technology-adoption capacity, typically by 
building their own laboratories and sending their engineers abroad for further training. 
Indigenous R&D came much later as most firms accumulated enough adoption 
technology. Therefore, the government policy of aiming at the promotion of R&D and a 
liberal technology import policy must have had a positive effect on the productivity 
performance of project-awarded firms. 
 
According to Science and Technology Yearbook by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the number of technology import cases reported was 285 during 1967-1971: 
electrical & electronics (65 cases), refinery & chemical (59 cases), and machinery (58 
cases), among other industries. The number increased sharply during the period of 
Korea’s investment in heavy and chemical industries (1972-1976) to a total of 434 cases: 
machinery (116 cases), refinery and chemical (85 cases), and electrical & electronics (84 
cases). However, as the Korean economy started to increase investment in technology 
intensive sectors such as semi-conductor and IT sectors from the mid-1980, the industrial 
composition also changed. The total number of technology import cases (5,830 cases) 
during the period of 1985-1996 is decomposed as electrical and electronics (2,016 cases, 
34.6%), machinery (1,714 cases, 29.4%) and refinery & chemical (979 cases, 16.8%). 
 
In terms of statistics on technology-licensing payments by countries, the United States 
was the dominant donor country during 1962-1966 with US$0.5 million (71.4%) out of a 
total of US$.0.7 million. After the diplomatic relationship with Japan was restored in the 
mid-1960s, Japan became the second largest technology supplier: During 1967-1972, a 
total of US$26.6 million was paid as a technology fee to the United States (US$11.0 
million, 41.4%) and Japan (US$10.5 million, 39.5%). In 1996, just before the financial 
crisis of 1997, the total technology fee payment reached a record high level of 
US$2,297.2 million with decomposition by the United States (US$1,160.0 million, 
50.5%) and Japan (US$723.9 million, 31.5%). So the United States and Japan continued 
to be the two dominant suppliers of technology to Korean industries.  
 
 
3.3 Investment in human capital, physical capital, infrastructure 
 
Korea’s policies affecting productivity can be categorized as (1) input-driven policies 
such as investment promotion, export-subsidy, and mass education policy; (2) R&D and 
technology-import policy; and (3) policies aimed at improving the overall socio-economic 
infrastructure.  
 
The mechanism of input-driven policies and productivity performance needs to be 
examined in depth because it is the core of the policy-productivity relationship, knowing 
that the Korean economy has been the beneficiary of input-driven policies rather than that 
of total factor productivity increase. First, on the theoretical side, I would explain the 
mechanism as a regulatory equilibrium in which monopolistic competition across 
industries prevails. As I have outlined in Pyo (2000), in such an imperfect competition 
model, the role of government serves two purposes: exit and entry regulator for each 
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monopolistic competition market, and performance-monitor for the distribution of policy 
loans though government-controlled financial intermediaries. 
 
I hypothesize that one of the key success elements in Korea’s input-driven policies is the 
fact that the government relied on the conglomerates’ export performance as the prime 
target criteria for awarding next round projects and further policy loan allocations. In 
other words, they have avoided their own type of subjective judgment system, which 
quite often entails bureaucratic corruption and political favoritism. 
 
In fact, one of the main reasons behind the 1997 financial crisis in Korea was the the 
failure to implement deregulation in financial industries by using an appropriate financial 
supervision mechanism. As outlined in Pyo (2000), the system of regulatory equilibrium 
with tight government control on the entry-exit of firms and financial intermediaries 
could be no longer maintained in the early 1990s as Korea went through a turbulent 
period of transition from authoritarian military regimes to a more democratic one. 
In what follows, we review determinants of input-driven productivity growth from, in 
turn, human capital, labor supply, physical capital and infrastructure. 
 
 
Human capital 
 
In terms of human capital accumulation, we should note a remarkable feature in the 
history of modern Korea. This is the introduction of mass-education in primary schools at 
unprecedented rates and at a time of starvation and political unrest. According to Kimura 
(1986), the overall primary enrolment ratio for boys in 1911, at the end of the Yi Dynasty, 
was 15.2-19.1 percent, and a survey of national illiteracy conducted by the colonial 
government as part of the population census in 1930 showed overall illiteracy rates of 
50.4 percent for males and 89.8 percent for females.  
 
The primary school enrolment ratio, which has been frequently used as a proxy for human 
capital in recent growth literature, has been raised twice in a remarkable way in the 
modern history of Korea. The first jump occurred during the 1930s after the Colonial 
Government of Imperial Japan adopted a conciliatory policy to integrate Koreans with 
mainland Japanese. They started introducing the Japanese system of education in place of 
the traditional apprenticeship-like Korean system called Seodang. By 1940, the primary 
school enrolment ratio ascended to about 60 percent and 30 percent for boys and girls 
respectively.  But a survey conducted by the post-colonial government in 1945 found that 
77 percent of adults over 13 years old still did not have the skills of reading and writing in 
the Korean language, Hangul. The US military government and the succeeding Rhee 
government had to make intensive efforts to eradicate adult illiteracy. The second jump 
occurred around 1957 when the Rhee government started introducing the American 
system of mass education, and the primary school enrollment ratio ascended to a level of 
70% without too much differential between boys and girls. 
 
By 1960, the primary school enrolment ratio had reached 99.8 percent as shown in the 
Appendix Table A4. However, the composition of population by educational attainment 
(25 years old and over) in 1966 shows that 79.6 percent of the population were primary 
school graduates or under, and only 3.7 percent were college graduates and over. Thus the 
initial condition of educational attainment in Korea in the 1960s can be summarized as 
the vast expansion of primary education with very limited higher education. On the other 
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hand, Korea adopted an education policy in which public education played a greater role 
in primary and secondary education than in tertiary education. The college-level 
education was left for competition between public and private colleges and universities. 
 
The hypothesis that I put forward here is that the beneficiaries of mass education in the 
1930s became the manager classes, and those of mass education in the 1950s became the 
major force of production and office work in the later development periods of 1960s and 
1970s. This seemingly two-tier system of human capital was the core of Korea’s success 
in late industrialization, and distinguishes it from other developing countries. 
 
As shown in Appendix Table A4, the composition of the population of 25 years old and 
over by educational attainment was: primary school graduates and under (79.6%), middle 
school graduates (11.1%), high school graduates (5.6%) and college graduates and over 
(3.7%) in 1966, and the corresponding rates became 23.0%, 13.3%, 39.4% and 24.3% in 
2000. So the fast and large-scale expansion of primary school education in the late 1950s 
was instrumental to developing an indigenous R&D capacity, enhancing technology 
adoption skills, and building up human capital through advances into higher education. 
 
As I have shown in Pyo (1998), the role of human capital in Korea in its earlier 
development stage was as a productive input rather than as accumulated knowledge to 
provide externality. The growth miracle of South Korea is not a miracle but the result of 
sustained accumulation and use of human capital. 
 
 
Labor supply 
 
Considering the unfavorable initial conditions such as lack of natural resources, high 
population density, existing twin gaps, and war-devastated socio-economic infrastructures 
by the early 1960s, the Korean government had to rely on a relatively abundant labor 
force to start up its engine for late development from 1962. 
 
Other than educational indicators, the initial conditions in Korea around the early 1960s 
were far from being favorable. The unemployment rate was high (8.1%) in 1963 and the 
dominant portion (63.0%) of the population was still left in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. Since the primary sector’s production share in the 1963 GDP was only 43.4 
percent, the economy was dominated by a low-productivity primary sector.  
 
The employment statistics by industry shows a typical pattern of rural-urban migration 
and primary-manufacturing shift during the period of 1960-1974. As the economy passed 
the Lewisian turning point and the period of unlimited supply of labor was over around 
1974, the unemployment rate was reduced from 8.1 percent in 1963 to 5 percent in 1974. 
The proportion of employed persons in the primary sector declined very fast from 63 
percent in 1963 to 34.0 percent in 1980 and 10.9 percent in 2000, while that of 
manufacturing increased quickly between 1963 and 1980 from 7.9 percent to 21.6 percent 
but remained flat until 2000 (20.2%). 
 
The shift in the labor supply from the primary sector to the secondary sector was made 
possible by various tax and subsidy incentives provided to manufacturing export 
industries. For example, there were tax incentives and, at times, subsidies in the 
construction of dormitory housing for plant workers and in the supply of wages-in-kind 
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such as free or low-cost meals and clothing etc. Many elementary workers, particularly 
women employees, found the dormitory life safer and more convenient with modern 
facilities such as TV sets and refrigerators. Of course, the primary motivation of the labor 
shift came from higher wages and salaries and job security in manufacturing. In the 
primary sector of agriculture and fishery, there was widespread disguised unemployment 
and the employment in the sector was very much cyclical and seasonal so that rural 
workers started dreaming of obtaining secured employment in an urban setting. Various 
OJT programs offered by firms eliminated the fear of urban employment on the part of 
migrating workers from rural areas. 
 
In summary, the pattern of labor supply in Korea during the last four decades can be 
characterized as follows. At the first stage (1960-1974), the vent-for-surplus type quantity 
of labor supply, helped by the rapid expansion of primary education, dominated the scene. 
Also at this stage, the shift was made from the primary sector to the secondary sector, 
helped by rural-urban migration. Then, in the second stage (1975-1987), there was a 
major intra-industrial labor shift within manufacturing from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to heavy and chemical manufacturing, as shown in Row 6 of the Appendix 
Table A4. In the third stage (1988-2000), as the Korean economy moved into a more 
information- and technology-intensive structure and service-oriented economy, the 
quality of labor rather than the quantity became more important than before.   
  
 
Physical capital  
 
The rate of growth in physical capital in Korea during the last four decades is truly an 
unprecedented one. UNIDO’s estimate of 11.21 percent annual growth is quite similar to 
my own estimate of 11.39 percent, even though the method of estimation is different. I 
have used the polynomial benchmark equation method linking four benchmark years’ 
data rather than the perpetual estimation method which assumes a 13.3 percent 
depreciation rate. My estimates of the economic depreciation rate for the aggregate capital 
stock were lower than 13.3 percent: 9.4 percent during 1977-1987 and 7.8 percent during 
1987-1997.  
 
The growth rate in Korea was higher than the growth rate (10.3%) of gross capital stock 
in Japan in its high growth period (1964-1985) and that of net stock in Taiwan (1960-
1987), as I noted in Pyo (1996, Table 4). Such a rapid accumulation of physical capital 
can be made possible under two conditions: One was a sustained continuation of high 
rates of return, and the other was a continued rise in the savings rate, in particular the 
private savings rate. As observed in Pyo and Nam (1999), Korea’s before-tax gross rate of 
return (gross operating surplus/ gross capital stock) was as high as 33.7% in 1971, higher 
than Japan’s gross rate of return (31.2%), which led Harberger to term the two economies 
“outliers”. At the same time, the two economies maintained savings rates higher than the 
OECD average. Even though both Japan and Korea experienced the rapid decline of rate 
of return from 1975 and from 1985 respectively, and their rates ultimately converged to 
the OECD average level by early 1990s, they had met these two conditions for the rapid 
accumulation of physical capital. 
 
The high rates of return in Korea during the 1970s and the1980s were made possible by 
the combination of two factors. One factor was the relative suppression of labor 
movement and wage increases, and the continued incentive for internal corporate-retained 
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earnings through a low-dividend policy. The other factor was households’ preference for 
higher savings and lower consumption for educational purposes, and investment in 
housing to guard themselves from hyperinflation.  
The expansion of primary education during late 1950s had opened up the possibility of 
moving up the ladder of higher education for many beneficiaries of primary education.  
They had been taught about the virtue of savings for higher education and for securing 
housing. The private savings rate in 1960 was only 5 percent, but this more than doubled 
within a decade and more than tripled within two decades. The gross savings rate 
increased from 9.0 percent in 1960 to 18 percent in 1970, 24.4 percent in 1980 and 32.4 
percent in 2000. The domestic gross investment ratio started off at 10.0 percent in 1960 
but increased fast to the level of 36.2 percent in 1980, exceeding the gross domestic 
savings rate, but then fell to 28.3 percent in 2000. The sustainable productivity growth in 
Korea over four decades since 1960 was made possible by the sustained growth of gross 
domestic savings, particularly private domestic savings, which were channeled into 
sustained domestic investment. Otherwise, Korea might have experienced foreign debt 
problems, as many Latin American countries did in the 1980s. 
 
According to the Economic Planning Board’s Main Economic Indicators (1980), out of 
total gross domestic capital formation (100%), the share of government savings declined 
from 37.8 percent in 1960 to 19.4 percent in 1979, while the share of households’ and 
non-profit organizations’ savings increased from – 16.9 percent to 29.2 percent. 
Williamson (1977) pointed out that Korean households’ financial savings were low 
because of the government’s low interest rate policy and high inflation rates, which made 
the real interest rate low.  
 
However, they saved in the form of housing without mortgage loans and other forms of 
savings in non-financial intermediaries. 
 
The allocation of capital through credit control and policy loan schemes in the earlier 
period and the more liberalized financial system in the later period must have contributed 
to the accumulation of physical capital because the waste of capital was closely monitored 
both by government and by banks controlled by the government. 
 
 
Infrastructure 
 
There was very little infrastructure in the early 1960s, too, as a consequence of the 
devastating Korean War, as summarized in the Appendix Table A4. The number of 
telephone subscribers per 100 persons was only 0.3 persons, the ratio of running water 
supply was only 16.8 percent, the electric power consumption per capita was only 46 
Kwh, and the number of registered motor vehicles per 1,000 persons was only 1.3 
vehicles. 
 
However, the Korean government allocated long-term and lower-interest loans from 
international lending institutions through the Korea Development Bank and the Korea 
Housing Bank, etc., to public corporations and enterprises such as the Korea Highway 
Corp., the Korea Railroad Corp., the Korea Electric Power Corp., and the Korea Marine 
and Port Management Corp., etc. The provision of social infrastructure was not always 
adequate  because the demand for social overhead services always exceeded their supply 
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since the speed of growth in other sectors such as manufacturing, export service, import 
service, and transportation and telecommunication was tremendously fast. 
 
The public corporations and enterprises which provided utility services and other social 
overhead services were closely monitored and evaluated by the government ministries in 
charge of the sector. From the mid-1980s their salaries and other benefit systems were 
linked to their performance, which was evaluated by an independent commission. They 
also began to be privatized from the mid-1990s to increase their efficiency. In general, 
there was no major bottleneck in the provision of social overhead services to support 
manufacturing activity, particularly in the supply of water, electric power and other vital 
services such as telecommunications. The electric power consumption per capita in 2000 
became 5,067 Kwh, the water supply ratio reached 87.1 percent, main telephone lines in 
operation per 100 persons reached 44.1 in 2000, which is comparable level with that of 
Japan (55.8 in 1999), and mobile telephone subscribers per 100 persons reached 54.9, 
which exceeded that of Japan (49.4). 
 
3.4 Institutions, integration and invariants 
 
The recent growth literature such as Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik (2003), goes 
beyond a mechanical explanation of factor accumulation for productivity growth, and 
emphasizes the importance of deep determinants such as geography, integration and 
institutions. However, these deep determinants are frequently historical endowments, and 
set initial conditions that cannot be altered by the development authorities at the time of 
launching a development plan. 
 
 
Historical endowments and initial conditions 
 
Korea had remained a hermit kingdom under the Lee Dynasty up until 1910 when it was 
annexed to Imperial Japan as a colony. The colonial experience under Japanese rule had a 
tremendous effect on Korea’s post-1945 development and the initial conditions at the 
time of launching the successive Five-Year Development Plans under President Park in 
1962. 
 
There have been both positive and negative evaluations of Korea’s colonial experience 
and its impacts on late industrialization. Some have argued that the forced annexation by 
Imperial Japan had deprived Koreans of the opportunity for the indigenous formation of a 
capitalist state and had ultimately invited the division of the Korean peninsula between 
North Korea and South Korea as a consequence of the emerging Cold War. They argue 
that modernization and industrialization under Japanese colonial rule served the 
imperialistic purpose and, therefore, these produced distorted growth without national 
capitalism. On the other hand, others have argued that, even though there was massive 
human rights violation and oppression, the colonial government of Japan had introduced 
mass-education in primary schools and had planted a form of industrialization through 
breeding manufacturing and laying out social overhead capital. 
 
The Korean experience after the turbulent period of independence in 1945, the 
establishment of the Republic of Korea in South Korea in 1948, and the Korean War 
during 1950-1953 all affected the initial conditions at the time of the development 
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planning stage and the pattern of late industrialization. There was very little physical 
capital to start with in 1962, due to the complete discontinuity in investments during the 
period of 1942-1953. There was war preparation by the Japanese Government (1942-
1945), which was followed by turmoil and massive immigration following independence 
in 1945. Then the Korean War broke out in 1950 with devastating effects on both 
physical and human capital. Even after the Korean War, the Korean Government had to 
rely on US aid to avoid starvation and carry out minimum reconstruction from the 
devastating war. 
 
Korea’s historical endowments and initial conditions in the early 1960s can be 
characterized as typical twin gaps, an investment-savings gap and a foreign exchange gap. 
In 1960, the domestic gross investment ratio was 10.0 percent, while the gross savings 
ratio and the private savings ratio were 9.0 percent and 5.0 percent respectively. The ratio 
of imports to GDP was 12.7 percent, while the ratio of exports was only 4.1 percent. 
Therefore, one can conclude that Korea’s initial conditions in the early 1960s were typical 
of an economy trapped in twin gaps. 
 
It has been often the case that the political economy of Korea’s economic development 
was ignored or treated as an exogenous factor. For example, the role of dictatorship in 
economic development has not been fully addressed. While the social and institutional 
set-up in Korea in the 1960s and 1970s certainly require an in-depth study of the 
interaction of politics and economics, we have not paid due attention to the impact of 
political suppression on economic development. 
 
The period of economic development (1961-1979) under President Park after he 
consolidated power through a coup on May 16, 1961 can be characterized as development 
under a typical development dictatorship. Its regime can be defined as an authoritarian 
regime. The period under President Chun (1980-1987) and President Roh (1988-2002), 
both with military backgrounds, can be characterized as a semi-authoritarian regime with 
a lesser degree of dictatorship but still with the mode of an authoritarian regime in 
planning and implementing development policies. 
 
The role of dictatorship in economic development in Korea has been controversial, as has 
that of the Japanese colonial rule. The positive aspect of dictatorship is that it mobilizes 
resources easily and allocates them among strategic sectors efficiently if there is relatively 
little corruption. However, for two reasons it cannot continue for a sustained period of 
time, even though it did so over three decades in the case of Korea. One is the so-called 
Lipset phenomenon that economic growth ultimately invites democracy, as I discussed at 
length in Pyo (1993). The other is the tendency that absolute dictatorship is endangered 
by corruption and collusion between government and business. Therefore, the dictatorship 
could be a necessary evil at certain earlier stages of economic development. But the 
longer it stays, the deeper its distortionary effects on entire sectors of the economy and it 
would, therefore, take a longer period of time to recover itself and restore the growth 
momentum. This could be a lesson for China, which has been growing quickly under an 
authoritarian regime. 
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Integration 
 
At the time of launching the economic development plans, Korea’s integration with the 
world economy was very shallow and fragile. It was somewhat land-locked by 
Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea in the cold war era. Trade with 
Japan had been lagging because of a sour relationship with the country in the past; a full 
diplomatic relationship with Japan was restored only in 1963. The United States was 
regarded as the source of foreign aid rather than as a trading partner. 
 
In 1961, the shares of exports (US$38.6 million) and imports (US$103.1 million) in GNP 
(US$2,103 million) were only 1.8 percent and 4.9 percent respectively. A gross savings 
rate of 11.7 percent was decomposed by a domestic savings rate of 2.9 percent and a 
foreign savings rate of 8.6 percent. Investment from abroad was US$47.4 million during 
the five-year period of 1962-1966, of which US$25 million (52.7%) was from the United 
States. 
 
However, by end of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1966, exports 
and imports increased to the level of US$253.7 million and US$673.2 million 
respectively, or by about 5 times and 6.6 times respectively from the 1961 level. Thus, 
Korea’s main window of integration was exports and imports. The export promotion 
policy under the slogan of “Export First” could not be maintained without an increase in 
imports because of the lower domestic contents of most export items at the time. But it 
opened the window to integrating Korea into the world market. Integration through trade 
was followed by technology imports to support export-oriented manufacturing and 
commercial loans and foreign direct investments throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
The success of Korea’s integration by exporting can be viewed in terms of  a combination 
of many factors: the availability of both unskilled labor at the earlier stage and skilled 
labor at the later stage through the expansion of the education system and credit rationing 
in favor of policy loans in the sectors strategically chosen. But at the same time, it should 
be emphasized that the transparency of a well-monitored export system itself was the 
most important element in the mechanics of self-generating export performance. The 
export regime adopted by the Park government during 1962-1979 was, basically, an 
incentive system in favor of well-performing exporters whose performance are judged not 
by the corrupted bureaucrats but by the international market, which demands a system of 
transparency. It also let entrepreneurship grow because, without it, an export market 
cannot be developed and maintained.  
 
One of the most important means of integration was education and training abroad, and 
the brain drain in the earlier period and the reverse brain drain in the later period. Even 
though there are few statistics on the magnitude of education abroad and the brain drain, a 
recent report by the Bank of Korea provides a startling statistic. The report estimates the 
total expenses of education and training in foreign countries, including living expenses of 
accompanying families, as US$6 billion in 2003, which exceeds by over three times the 
official remittance (US$1.85 billion) reported in the balance of payments. This amount is 
about one-third of the total household expenditure on education (22.2 trillion Won – US$ 
18.6 billion at the average exchange rate of 1,191.9 Won per US dollar). 
 
In terms of economic integration with other countries through free trade agreements 
(FTA), Korea has been a latecomer. An FTA with Chile in 2003 was the first, and an FTA 
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with Japan is at an initiation stage. However, integration by joining the OECD and the 
WTO in the mid-1990s has influenced the nation tremendously. As I have argued in Pyo 
(2000), the 1997 financial crisis in Korea was the consequence of adjustment failure 
under pressure by the WTO and the OECD to open up the domestic economy in both 
trade and finance. It was more or less an institutional failure due to lax bank supervision 
of corporate financing and mismanagement of short-term debt. 
          
 
3.5 Competition, social dimension and environment 
 
Korea has maintained a competitive environment in social mobility through education. It 
has also pursued egalitarian social and economic policies which may have helped 
productivity growth.  
 
The constant inflow of scientists and engineers from abroad was made possible as 
Korea’s economic development passed the Lewisian turning-point in the mid-1970s and 
since then followed sustainable long-term high-growth. In the background of such 
constant inflow lies the mass-education but very competitive education system. In such a 
social environment, promoting one’s human capital was commensurate with promoting 
one’s physical and financial wealth. 
 
On the other hand, in terms of industrial policy, the government has deliberately 
introduced limited competition by lowering entry barriers over time and by monitoring 
market failures by major conglomerates in order to maximize the efficiency of limited 
resources, as I have outlined in Pyo (2000). In other words, the government has played 
the role of competition promoter and supervisor through government-controlled banks, 
which are part of a quasi-internal organization. In this regard, the system has promoted 
monopolistic competition across industries. That is why one observes in Korea a larger 
number of automobile manufacturers, telecommunication equipment producers, mobile 
phone companies and so on than those normally observed in many developing countries 
or smaller advanced countries.  
 
For example, in automobiles there were at least three producers, and in electronics there 
were always more than three competitors. In the case of the semiconductor industry, 
Samsung entered the market in the early 1980s, following the Japanese semiconductor 
manufacturers. But then the Korean government allowed market entry by Lucky-Gold 
Star (LG) and Hyundai to promote competition. Such an example is not limited to export 
industries. The monopoly of the Korean Airline Group in the airline business was broken 
when the government allowed the second airline, Asiana’s, market entry in the mid-1980s. 
In the case of mobile telecommunication, the government tried to break the monopoly of 
SK in cellular phone service by issuing another license to a cellular operator called 
Shinsegi and then introduced further competition by issuing licenses to three PCS service 
providers. The bureaucrats wanted to avoid such blame that they are bribed or lobbied by 
a certain business conglomerate. 
 
Together with an abundant reserve labor force with a minimum education level, the social 
environment in a relatively egalitarian state seems to have interacted positively toward 
gearing up to launch an economic development plan. As outlined in Pyo (1996), the 
ruling class in the colonial period was discredited after Korea gained independence from 
 28 
Republic of Korea 
Japan, and most landowners lost power after the land reform in 1949 and the subsequent 
Korean War. The Korean social environment in the early 1960s was pretty much a 
classless society in which the average household regarded a better education for their 
children as the best investment for upward social mobility. The Confucian tradition in 
favor of education must have acted positively, too, but it should be noted that the 
household’s choice of educational investment was a rational economic choice rather than 
a cultural or religious one. The parents expected higher rates of return on the education of 
their children because in a classless society upward social mobility is determined by 
education. 
 
While there was a strong notion that Korea started off in the early 1960s as a relatively 
egalitarian society, the rapid accumulation of capital after the launching of the 
development plan could have made income distribution worse than before. There are no 
reliable statistics for income distribution in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey by the National Statistical Office provided an index of 
concentration (Gini Coefficient) starting from 1985 and the Urban Wage Earners’ 
Households Income survey starting from 1993. These two sources of income distribution 
statistics show a conflicting pattern. The Family Income and Expenditure Survey  Gini 
coefficient improved from 0.345 in 1985 to 0.295 in 1996, just before Korea’s financial 
crisis of 1997, as shown in the Appendix Table A4. On the other hand, the latter Gini 
coefficient deteriorated from 0.281 in 1993 to 0.291 in 1996 and 0.317 in 2000. The latter 
Gini coefficient seems more reliable because it reflects the impact of a financial crisis on 
income distribution: in general, a financial crisis worsens income distribution because of 
the increase in unemployment and high interest policy ensuing after the crisis, which 
makes the rich richer and the poor poorer because the former have financial assets while 
the latter have financial debts. 
 
Alternatively, we can examine the trend of labor income share in both the aggregate 
economy and manufacturing as an indirect indicator of functional income distribution. 
The share of labor income in the aggregate economy estimated by the Bank of Korea 
shows an increasing trend from 1953 (0.27) to 1960 (0.39), 1980 (0.51) and 2000 (0.59). 
 
My estimate of the labor income share in manufacturing also shows a steady upward 
trend but with some fluctuation from 1953 (0.42) to 1960 (0.49), 1980 (0.58), 1996 (0.66) 
and 2000 (0.52). The reduction of the labor income share from 1996 to 2000 reflects the 
impact of the financial crisis in 1997 and is consistent with the worsened Gini coefficient 
of urban wage earners’ household income. At the same time, it is a manifestation of the 
factor price equalization theorem in the long-run that as a relatively labor-abundant 
country engages in free trade, the wage increases relative to the price of capital: the free 
trade benefits the relatively abundant factor of the trading country. 
 
Other social network policies include a minimum wage law, which was adopted in the 
early 1980s after 20 years of carrying out economic development plans. They also include 
a labor relations law and welfare policy for the handicapped, and for households below 
the absolute-poverty income level. Even though these welfare policies still lag far behind 
industrial nations, they must have helped in improving the overall socio-economic 
infrastructure and improving productivity at family level.  
 
Looking at labor union statistics from the Appendix Table A4, we note that the numbers 
of trade unions and trade union members increased between 1981 and 2000 from 2,141 to 
                                                                                                                                        29 
Productivity performance 
5,698 and from 967,000 persons to 1,527,000 persons respectively. However, the union 
membership rate declined from 20.8 percent to 12.0 percent during the same period. Both 
the number of labor dispute cases and the working days lost improved from the peak year 
of 1988 to 2000. 
 
Lastly, policies aimed at improving the overall socio-economic infrastructure may include 
the Social Overhead Capital (SOC) Policy, the Land and Rural Development Policy and 
the Education and other Social Network Policy. The Korean government has directed 
most project loans from international public lending institutions such as the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank to the Social Overhead Capital Sector (highways, port 
facilities, railroad, water supply and highways, and hospitals and other health facilities), 
through public enterprises because their loans tend to be long-term loans with lower 
interest rates.  
 
The Land and Rural Development Policy aimed at avoiding excessive urbanization, 
particularly in the Seoul metropolitan area, in order to reduce inflation in land and 
housing prices. The New Village Movement under President Park aimed at improving 
agricultural productivity by carrying out a rural development program.  
 
 
3.6 Issues specific to Korea  
 
Korea-specific factors such as the historical legacy coming from the Japanese colonial 
period (1910-1945) and the division of the Korean peninsula and the resulting national 
preoccupation with security issues should be addressed. Political environment and 
security issues should be added to provide a broader picture of Korea’s unique 
development history.  
 
The defense budget took 53.7 percent of the Korean government expenditure in 1953, 
35.0 percent in 1960, 20.0 percent in 1990 and 11.2 percent in 1999. At the time of 
launching the Economic Development Plan in the early 1960s, the defense budget was a 
burden to the economy. At times, the constant confrontation with North Korea was used 
as a means of political suppression by authoritarian regimes and suppression of trade 
union movements. However, the security issue had some positive aspects in lifting up the 
overall productivity of the economy. For example, the national conscription system might 
have deprived Korean youths of their opportunity to advance to the next rung on the 
ladder of learning and training, but it also provided them with a minimum general 
education to read and write and, most of all, discipline as workforce. 
 
The vent-for-surplus type supply of labor force was the cornerstone of Korea’s rapid 
industrialization. But it was only a part of the necessary conditions. There must be 
interaction in a market economy between government and entrepreneurs. The government 
established after a military coup by President Park in 1961 lacked the legitimacy of a 
democratically elected government. They therefore sought to restore the popularity of 
their regime by carrying out economic development plans successfully. In other words, 
their political stability depended on economic prosperity, and most of all they had to 
create jobs for the urban unemployed and the vast disguised unemployed in the rural 
sector. 
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Economic development and late industrialization is often a complex interaction between 
endogenous historical heritages and imported institutional elements. It involves more than 
mechanical income-growth dynamics. Therefore, we want to go beyond the traditional 
explanations of the determinants of the free market system and search for more cultural 
and historical factors. The reason is that without expanding the boundaries of our research 
we may not be able explain the rising sentiments of anti-market movements and pro-
socialist policy doctrines under increasingly unwarranted egalitarianism in recent years in 
Korea. 
 
Recent researches on history and culture have argued that religious practices and beliefs 
have important consequences for economic development. They have argued that 
explanations for economic growth should go further to include a nation’s culture. We 
have tended to ignore or underestimate the cultural and religious aspects of 
entrepreneurship, which is the core of free enterprise system. As Barro and McCleary 
(2003) have demonstrated, religiosity affects economic growth and, in turn, the pattern of 
economic growth will affect religiosity. For example, the percentage of the population 
with religious beliefs  in Korea increased from 42.6 percent in 1985 to 53.6 percent in 
1999, while per capita GNP increased from US$2,242 to US$9,438.  
 
According to the Social Statistics Survey by the National Statistical Office, there is 
religious pluralism in Korea: the decomposition of religion is Buddhism (49.0%), 
Protestantism (34.7%), Catholicism (13.0%), Confucianism (1.3%), and others (2.0%). 
Such pluralism in religion combined with other cultural heritages must have affected not 
only work ethics but also entrepreneurship.  
 
During the process of rapid economic development, the Korean people used to think that 
the remarkable achievement of growth was mainly due to either the government’s 
planning or the work ethics of the ordinary workers, without realizing the role of the 
entrepreneur in finding business opportunities. They regarded the free-enterprise system 
as basically an implanted system, and viewed it as a free good in a capitalist society. In 
recent years, while there is ample evidence of the benefits of the free enterprise system, 
some anti-market and anti-business sentiment has been growing among civil activists, 
intellectuals, and union leaders. We have begun to realize that the free enterprise system 
is not free. 
 
The free enterprise system and entrepreneurship are like the two sides of a coin: without 
one, the other cannot survive. As I argued before, one of the main reasons why Korea 
could grow so fast under a dictatorship was because the dictatorship was relatively less-
corrupted and it pursued export promotion, maintaining a certain degree of transparency 
in who got what and how. Through this system, entrepreneurship in Korea could be 
nurtured, making it one of the most successful stories of recent industrialization. 
 
The current situation could become worse, as many international consulting organizations 
ascribe the poor performance in national competitiveness to an environment and 
institutions hostile to business activities. This hostile environment inside Korea is a fatal 
problem for further growth, as international economies become more integrated: Korean 
firms tend to stop investing domestically, and foreign investments do not flow into Korea.   
 
In order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Korea’s development strategy and 
identify the policy-side determinants of Korea’s productivity performance during the four 
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decades of 1960-2000, we need to review policy documents and directives by major 
ministries such as the Economic Planning Board (now the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy), the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology etc. We also need to refer to policy survey literatures published by various 
government think tanks such as the Korea Development Institute (KDI), the Korea 
Institute of Industrial Economy and Technology (KIET) and the Korea Institute of 
International Economic Policy (KIEP) etc. We discuss these policy issues in the 
following chapter. 
 
 
Ranking relative importance of determinants 
 
As outlined above, each determinant of productivity must have played a different role in 
productivity growth and its rapid convergence. Among numerous determinants which 
must have mutually interacted, I would, without hesitation, rate human capital determined 
by historical precondition as the most important determinant. The enlargement of primary 
education and upward mobility in the education system are the key elements in improving 
the nation’s stock of human capital. Human capital enhances knowledge, absorptive 
capacity, indigenous R&D efforts, and institutional environments. 
 
The second most important determinant is the maturity of social institutions and political 
stability. Without maturity and stability in socio-economic institutions, a development 
program cannot be maintained. We can find numerous histories of failure in development 
programs in modern world history. Most of them failed not because there was a lack of 
physical capital or resources but because there was social disruption and political 
instability. 
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IV.   Discussion of policies with effect on productivity 
 
 
4.1   Direct productivity-enhancing policies 
 
There have been policies that have had a direct impact on productivity increase in the 
Republic of Korea. Even though the modes of such policies varied over time, they have 
attempted the promotion of R&D, the adoption of new technology, and industrial 
restructuring or targeting from the lower-productivity sector to the higher-productivity 
sector. 
 
As we have outlined in the previous chapter, the policy direction taken by the Korean 
government during the period of 1953-1961 was the promotion of import-substituting 
manufacturing by means of allocating foreign exchange earned through foreign aid. There 
were, therefore, very few direct productivity-enhancing policies during the period of 
1953-1961. 
 
The trend continued even after the formal launching of the Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan in 1962. From 1962 to 1981, most productivity-enhancing policies 
were of the second type: targeting the strategic export-promoting sector, designating 
certain areas as Export Processing Zones (EPZ), and a series of trade policies designed to 
promote export industries. There was very little policy attempt to improve R&D facilities 
and technology adoption until the early 1980s. 
 
It is well known that increased spending on R&D can lead to the discovery of new 
technologies or the development of new products that contribute to higher productivity. 
But in many developing countries, R&D can be wasted because of the lack of an R&D 
infrastructure and motivation for an indigenous R&D effort. Korea was no exception. It 
was only after experiencing two-rounds of oil crisis and the first year of negative real 
GDP growth (-2.1%) in 1980 that the new government of the post-Park regime realized 
the limitation of extensive growth based on factor accumulation and capacity expansion 
under the so-called “ Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Policy ”, and started to seek 
new sources of growth. According to MCI, the policy targets announced in February 1982 
included export promotion with enhanced value-added, the upgrading and rationalizing of 
industrial structure, and the enhancement of industrial competitiveness through 
maintaining balanced growth among different sectors. 
 
Most R&D policies were formulated by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
in consultation with the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (MCI), so that there were checks and balances among ministries on R&D 
expenditure. By the end of March 1982, MOST had selected a total of 108 special R&D 
projects which were to be carried out by 80 private firms (a total of US$7.2 million) and 
28 government research institutions or enterprises (a total of US$18.7 million). 
 
In June 1982, MOST announced a Five-Year R&D Plan for Fine Chemical Industries, 
selecting 200 projects in five areas of specialization (a total of US$62.8 million of private 
funds and US$77.5 million of government funds). 
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In February 1984, the government announced a plan to co-fund, with the private sector, a 
total of US$100 million by 1988, aimed at promoting basic R&D. In March of the same 
year, the Ministry of Finance announced that it would provide R&D funds not only to 
hardware manufacturers but also to software manufacturers. In September, the Bank of 
Korea announced that it would increase financial support to small and medium industries 
(SMI) who adopted technology innovation plans and new technology development. 
 
In January 1985, the Ministry of Finance announced an ambitious plan of mobilizing a 
total of US$243.7 million as R&D funds for technology development from five financial 
institutions including the Korea Development Bank (KDB) and the National Investment 
Fund (NIF). In August 1986, MCI announced a plan to support software industries by 
funding them as infant industries through the Industrial Development Fund (IDF) in order 
that they could prepare for import liberalization and intellectual property rights issue. On 
the other hand, MOST announced a plan to spend a total of US$126.2 million as a special 
R&D expenditure in three representative technology-intensive frontier industries: the fine 
chemical, semi-conductor and new material industries. 
 
In November 1986, MCI selected a total of 219 manufacturing processes which were in 
need of urgent R&D projects (837 cases), and announced that it would support those 
selected R&D projects and that they were to be completed in two years by 1988. 
 
 
4.2 Indirect productivity-enhancing policies 
 
One of the most important and effective productivity-enhancing policies was the 
incentive system for export promotion. After the First-Five Year Economic Development 
Plan was launched in January 1962 by President Park, who had consolidated power after 
a military coup in May 1961, MCI introduced an Export-Import Link System in January 
1963. The system was designed to give incentives and favors to those who actually 
exported, by giving them a license to import, which was often a lucrative business. In 
March 1965, MCI announced an import licensing system, based on installment payments, 
for equipments of export industries. 
 
A series of policies were followed to promote export. In March 1963, MCI asked 
exporters to report export cases to them where they were suffering from delayed 
transportation and bottlenecks in cargo shipping. In September 1964, the bill for Export 
Industrial Complex was passed in the National Assembly. In April 1965, the Monetary 
Board of the Bank of Korea established rules and regulations on opening letters of credit  
to raw material imports for export-processing, and construction and equipments for export 
industries. Japanese private commercial loans to the value of US$20 million, which was a 
part of the concessionary terms and conditions of restoring diplomatic relations with 
Japan. This was allocated to purchasing raw materials and machinery and equipments for 
export processing. 
 
There were also sector-specific indirect policies to provide overall social overhead capital 
and financial capital to strategic industries. In July 1967, the first year of the Second Five-
Year Economic Development Plan, the Government selected Pohang and Ulsan as 
industrial complex areas for the steel and petrochemical industries respectively. In 
November 1967, the Government decided to invest a total of 64.4 billion Won (foreign 
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loan of US$190 million and a domestic loan of 34.8 billion Won) for the construction of 
the First Steel Manufacturing Plant. 
 
In July 1968, MCI announced that it would promote the electronics industry by 
earmarking 900 million Won from the 1969 budget. In January 1969, MCI realigned 
export specialization industries as 10 industries, including electronics, by supporting a 
total of US$60 million of foreign capital and 973 million Won of domestic capital. In 
June 1969, MCI announced a Basic Plan for the Promotion of the Electronics Industry 
under the Electronics Promotion Law. In June 1970, a total of 51 electronics items were 
selected for development in 1970 and provided with1.13 billion Won from the Electronics 
Development Fund. In September 1969, EPB designated the city of Masan as an Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ), inviting foreign capital into labor-intensive industries. 
 
In November 1970, MCI added shipbuilding as a strategic export industry, and decided to 
increase the capacity to 100,000-ton level by 1971, and to consolidate small and medium–
sized shipbuilders to make them competitive. In April 1973, MCI drafted a long-term 
promotion plan for the shipbuilding industry by providing 145.8 billion Won so that 
domestic demand could be filled by domestic supply by 1976 and that Korea would 
become the 10th largest shipbuilding nation. 
 
In February 1972, MCI designated the machinery industry as a target industry for 
localization and import substitution. It selected a total of 1,549 items for the promotion of 
domestic production by providing a Machinery Industry Promotion Fund. In July 1972, 
MCI selected 13 import-substituting industries such as oil products, paints, office 
machines and ceramics, with the aim of transforming them into export industries to 
diversify exports. 
 
In May 1973, the government established Guidelines for Foreign Capital Inducement for 
the Development of Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI). The Guidelines stipulated the 
ratio of own capital to borrowed capital to be at a minimum 30:70, and that, in the case of 
joint ventures, the equity share of foreign investment could not exceed 50 percent. 
Subsequently, in August of the same year, the Government decided to induce foreign 
capital of US$10 billion for the development of HCI, and created the National Investment 
Fund by issuing a National Investment Bond to maximize the mobilization of domestic 
resources for HCI. In September the Government designated four industrial development 
areas (Onsan, Changwon, Yeosu and Kwangyang) for HCI. In October, it changed Korea 
Export Promotion Ltd., which was a government enterprise, into a general trading 
company (GTC). Later, major business groups followed it, establishing their own GTCs 
as window firms for export marketing, finance and foreign investment. According to a 
domestic financial plan drafted in February 1974, the share of HCI would be 68.4 percent 
while the remainder (31.6%) would go to light manufacturing sector. In November 1981, 
the government decided to build the Second Integrated Steel Plant in Kwangyang by 1988 
by investing a total of US$2.7 billion (domestic investment of US$1.6 billion and a 
foreign loan of US$1.1 billion). 
 
On the question of labor policy, the cabinet approved the Decree on Labor Dispute 
Coordination for Foreign Investment Companies in December 1969 to induce foreign 
capital. The Korean economy was approaching the end of its unlimited labor supply in the 
early 1970s. The government, therefore, introduced a comprehensive on-the-job training 
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(OJT) program in May 1973 to help firms overcome the shortage of skilled labor during 
the Third Five-Year Development Period (1972-1976). 
 
The experience of the second oil shock and the first negative growth in 1980 in the 
political instability following the assassination of President Park meant that the entire 
HCI plans needed to be reevaluated. The turning point in Korea’s industrial policy came 
in 1983 when the government switched from direct industrial promotion to an indirect 
and functional support system. In other words, the new industrial support system was 
designed to avoid sector-specific industrial promotion and a targeting strategy, and to 
introduce more competition through import liberalization. Under the new paradigm of 
industrial policy, the government, for example, instead of supporting specific industries 
such as cement and steel manufacturing, supported investments in energy-saving 
machinery and equipments by introducing a variety of financial-incentive and tax-
incentive systems. At the same time, the relative importance in industrial targeting was 
switched from capital-intensive industries to technology-intensive industries. Samsung 
started investing in semi-conductor manufacturing in order to catch up with Japanese 
firms, and the Korean government allowed LG and Hyundai to enter into the semi-
conductor market to promote competition. There was also active support for the software 
industries in order to promote technology-intensive industries. 
 
As a conclusion on the link between government policy and productivity enhancement, 
the experience of Korea provides us with clear evidence of the positive role of the 
government in promoting productivity through both direct policies such as public R&D 
expenditure and indirect policies based upon subsidies and other incentive systems. But 
the set of government policies aimed at promoting productivity needs to be coordinated in 
terms of timing and internal checks and balances. The implementation of such policies at 
the right time is one of the most important aspects. For example, high educational 
capacity can be a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for large-scale public 
R&D expenditure. At the beginning of industrial development, technological diffusion 
rather than technological innovation could be more important and practical so that large-
scale public R&D can be launched at a later stage of development when an R&D 
infrastructure is built and genuine motivation emerges for an indigenous R&D effort, as 
Korea waited until the early 1980s.  
 
 
4.3 The Political economy and institutional aspects 
 
Both public and private institutions were set up by interest groups reflecting the political 
economy of development plans at the time they were established. For example, the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) was established in January 1961 by bigger business 
groups and conglomerates. The military coup in May 16, 1961 made the drafting of 
economic development plan inevitable because the new government had to establish its 
legitimacy by appealing to the public on the basis that their coup was necessary to help 
save the nation’s economy. Economic development rather than a full genuine democracy 
was advanced as the foremost national goal. 
 
The military government, which had frozen all financial institutions on May 16, started to 
allow financial transactions on May 18, and introduced a series of reform measures. They 
announced basic economic policy plans on May 31 and the First Five Year Economic 
Development Plan (1962-1966) on July 22. They also introduced a series of populist 
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policies such as the High-interest Loan Rescheduling Scheme for Agriculture and Fishery, 
which was designed to soothe farmers and fishers who were suffering from high-interest 
curb-market loans. They also introduced the Illegal Assets Liquidation Act, which was 
forced upon a few business groups which were suspected of accumulating assets by rent-
seeking and political connections. 
 
On the institutional side, the military government introduced several reform measures. 
They created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to implement an economic 
development plan. They also established the Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Bank in 1961. In February 1962, Ulsan Industrial Area was 
designated and its construction started. On June 10, the Emergency Monetary Reform 
Measure was announced by redenominating the currency unit from 10 Hwan to 1 Won to 
curb hyperinflation and identify the tax base.  
 
In 1965, the government started introducing environmental measures to protect the 
environment as the economic development plan got underway. In May it announced a 
Seven-Year Forestry Development Plan as part of the Second Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan, and the installation of 100,000 street lighting in rural areas within the 
year. In June the Ministry of Construction drafted a ten-year master plan for the 
development of water resources, including the construction of multi-purpose dams for 
generating electric power, and a flood control system. In June 1970, as part of the Third 
Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the Integrated Energy Development Plan was 
drafted and included atomic power plant (600,000 KW). 
 
In December 1970, the government decided to put up 314 billion Won for the 10 years 
from 1971 to develop the four largest river basin areas as part of a water management 
policy. In March 1976, MCI announced a plan to raise the electrification rate of rural 
areas from 65 percent to 77 percent by allocating fiscal and financial funds of 5.6 billion 
Won. These policies aimed at balanced growth between urban and rural areas in an 
attempt to mitigate the impact of rapid urbanization and industrialization. 
 
The government also introduced several measures for foreign trade and foreign capital 
inducement. In March 1966, the Korea-Japan Trade Agreement was signed, and in July 
the Foreign Capital Inducement Act, which integrated several decrees and laws, was 
passed by National Assembly. In March 1967, the government decided to join GATT. In 
June 1968, it signed tariff concession schedules for 18 items through the GATT 
Representative Office. In January 1968, MCI announced a plan to introduce an export 
insurance system. In June 1969, the Korea Export Import Bank was established to finance 
the medium and long-term financing of exports and imports. In February 1972, EPB 
announced a plan to improve the balance of payments by switching from a direct tax 
system on an item-by-item basis to indirect regulation through tariffs, exchange rates and 
import support. In 1973, the government abolished special tariff measures, and introduced 
a flexible tariff system and abolished the direct tax exemption policy for export industries. 
The ex ante tariff exemption on raw material imports for export processing was switched 
to  an ex post tariff rebate system. In April 1986, the government changed the approval 
system for foreign capital inflow to a registration system, and enlarged the scope of the 
positive system under which the list of permissible items was identified. 
 
In order to promote competition among big firms, the Fair Trade Act was introduced in 
October 1971. In 1981, the Fair Trade Commission designated a total of 666 firms in 14 
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industries as restricted from forming cartels. In June 1985, the government required 
Chaebols to register their cartels in order to avoid their excessive concentration of power. 
At the present time, the Fair Trade Commission remains a powerful watchdog against 
large conglomerates and Chaebols. 
 
The transition from an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime to a democratic one was 
far from smooth. At times Korea had to go through a very turbulent period, both 
politically and economically. As I observed in Pyo (2000), a distinguishing feature of 
export-led growth in Korea was its unique industrial structure. The government policy 
protected bureaucrats from accusations of being linked to one or two conglomerates’ 
interest but, at the same time, provided big conglomerates with irresistible incentives for 
horizontal diversification. The phenomenon of ‘too big to fail’ set in because big 
conglomerates themselves were stockholders of many financial institutions and the moral 
hazard in financial institutions started eroding their competitiveness. The top thirty 
conglomerates were producing over half of Korea’s GNP, and the top five conglomerates’ 
share was as much as one-third of the country’s total production. 
 
The business groups called ‘chaebol’ in Korea many look quite similar to the Japanese 
‘zaibatsu’, but they are different in many respects. First, Korean chaebols had to rely on 
developing the export market more intensively than the Japanese firms because their 
domestic market size was less than 5 per cent of the Japanese domestic market size in 
1975 (US$20.9 billion, as against US$499 billion, in terms of GNP) and less than 9 per 
cent in 1995 (US$453 billion, as against $5156 billion, in terms of GNP). As a result, two 
types of zaibatsu could coexist in Japan: one a highly specialized technology leader in 
multinational markets (for example, Toyota, Sony and Toshiba) and the other a business 
group of horizontally diversified firms (for example, the Mitsubishi group, the Mitsui 
group, the Sumitomo group and the Fuji group). But, in Korea, only the latter type (for 
example, Samsung, Hyundai and Lucky-Goldstar) could be established because 
specialization was riskier than diversification in the oligopolistic setting with the 
government regulation on entry and exit. In addition, diversification through cross-
shareholding could generate higher economies of scale in a limited domestic market.  
 
Second, the way the business groups are governed in Korea is quite different from that in 
Japan. As a result of dissolution of zaibatsu under the MacArthur administration, there 
were few dominant family groups which could own and manage zaibatsu. The corporate 
ownership structure in Japan is a more diversified one than that in Korea, and the role of 
institutional investors is much more important in Japan than in Korea. As a result, the 
decision-making process and corporate governance in Japan are much more consensus-
based than those in Korea. Such a difference in ownership structure and governing pattern 
could make a substantial difference to the outcome of the excess competition because a 
more consensus-based system can survive better than an authoritarian owner-management 
system at the time of policy failure, and can protect itself from over-extension through a 
built-in system of checks and balances. 
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V.    Concluding remarks  
 
 
Since the early 1990s, the model of monopolistic competition across industries in Korea 
has been subject to change, both domestically and internationally. First of all, the so-
called ‘Lipset phenomenon’ has arrived on the sociopolitical scene in Korea, as outlined 
in Pyo (1993). The country’s success in export-led growth brought about increasing 
demands for democracy, and the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic 
one has been turbulent rather than smooth. The increasing demand for higher wages and 
benefits by organized labor through, at times, violent disputes and strikes placed an extra 
burden on firms’ efforts at restructuring and ‘downsizing’. But most important of all, in 
the face of increasing domestic and foreign competition, some monopolistic competitors 
carried out a series of ill-fated pre-emptive strategic investments. As anticipated in Pyo et 
al, (1996), the potential impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in a general-
equilibrium context became much greater than those in a partial-equilibrium context. One 
typical manifestation of such an impact was over-investment in non-tradable sectors and 
pre-emptive investment in some tradable sectors.  
 
Considering the current market trend towards deregulation and privatization, it was 
difficult for the government to discourage this entry. Even though it did not materialize, 
owing to the objections by the government and the subsequent financial turmoil, we could 
have seen another pattern of oligopolistic competition in the steel industry, too. Many 
Korean firms in the automobile industry and the semi-conductor industry tried to put 
themselves in strategic positions in the global market. They seemed to take the view that 
there was an increasing demand for their products from emerging markets and transition 
economies. They regarded their products as not necessarily top-quality goods but as 
reasonably priced, competitive products in such markets. Their success or failure 
depended on their income-generating capacities because they had to pay back the interest 
and principals of the loans they had borrowed from domestic and foreign banks. This 
game of high-yield high-risk in strategic markets was to determine the substantiality of 
export-led growth in Korea. Such a game could not have been maintained if there was no 
moral hazard in the financial sector and if the government was strong enough to insulate 
its bureaucrats from the distributive politics among chaebols and other interest groups, 
including labor unions. But neither condition was met. In addition, the owner-
management corporate governance without consensus building and internal checks and 
balances resulted in over-investment in existing business and caused excessive 
competition against a background of moral hazard in the financial sector and lax banking 
supervision by weak government. In my judgment, this was the most fundamental cause 
of the financial crisis in Korea. 
 
A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF (2003) has 
characterized the financial crisis of 1997 in East Asia as a new type of balance of 
payments crisis, which was triggered by massive capital inflows followed by sudden 
capital outflows. In particular, the report has noted that the nature of the crisis in Korea 
and Indonesia was “twin crises” in which the external crisis coincided with a banking 
crisis. We can identify South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines 
as five Asian-Crisis countries, and Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and China as  
five East Asian non-crisis countries. 
                                                                                                                                        39 
Productivity performance 
The overall assessment of the macroeconomic performance of Asian-Crisis countries is 
that the rebound of growth over the period of 1999-2000 slowed down in the subsequent 
period of 2001-2003, mainly because of stagnant demand for domestic investment across 
all the crisis-inflicted economies. In particular, the domestic investment in machinery and 
equipment was very disappointing. For example, in the case of Korea, its average annual 
growth rate was 17 percent during the pre-crisis period of 1994-1996 and became 
negative during the crisis-years of 1997(- 9.6%) and 1998(- 42.3%). Then the average 
annual growth rate became explosively positive in 1999 (36.8%) and 2000 (33.6%), but 
suddenly dropped in 2001 (-9.0%), 2002 (7.5%) and 2003 (-1.2%).  
 
There are two main issues at hand in examining the investment trend in the post-recovery 
period in Asian-Crisis countries. One issue is whether the stagnation in investment is a 
permanent phenomenon and, therefore, the period of the “East Asian Miracle” is over. 
The other issue is why the volatility of investment was so large during the post-crisis 
period of 1999-2003. 
 
In order to resume sustainable growth and renew the productivity convergence, Korea 
needs to find a new paradigm and system under drastically changed social and political 
landscapes. The Korean economy has been struggling to find such a path under a non-
authoritarian regime. It may take much longer time than expected because under the 
current mode of globalization, relying on market mechanism seems to be the only 
solution for a small open economy like that of Korea. 
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Table A4    Major social and economic indicators of Korea (1960-2000) 
 
Social and Economic Indicators 1953 1960 1980 2000 
1. Population Trend (In thousand persons)     
Census Enumeration  24,989 37,436 46,136 
Household (In thousand)  4,371 7,969  
Average number of member (In persons)  5.6 4.5  
Estimates of midyear population 20,5271 25,012 38,124 47,008 
Male 10,083 1  12,551 19,236 23,667 
Female 10,443 1  12,462 18,888 23,341 
Sex ratio (per 100 female) 96.6 1  100.7 101.8 101.4 
Population density (persons per sq. Km) 208.5 1  254.1 385.1 472.6 
2. Summary of Economically Active Population     
Population 15-year old and over  14,5512 24,463 36,139 
Economically active population  8,230  2 14,431 21,950 
Employed  7,563  2 13,683 21,061 
Unemployed  667  2 748 889 
Non-economically active population  6,321  2 10,032 14,189 
Unemployment rate (%)  8.1  2 5.2 4.1 
3. Employed Persons by Industry (%)     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  63.03 34.0 10.86 
Mining and manufacturing  8.7  3 22.5 20.23 
Manufacturing  7.9  3 21.6 20.15 
Social overhead capital and other services  28.3  3 43.5 68.91 
Construction  2.5  3 6.2 7.5 
Wholesale & retail trade, restaurants & hotels   19.2 27.2 
Transport, storage & communication   4.5 6.0 
Finance, insurance, real estate & business, service   2.4 9.9 
4. National Income (At current prices)     
GNI (US$ billion) 1.44 1.9 60.9 635.4 
GDP (US$ billion)  1.3 2.0 62.2 457.4 
Per Capita GNI (US$) 675 79 1,598 9,628 
5. Growth rate by kind of economic activities 6(%)     
GNI 5.17 1.18 -5.3 3.6 
GDP 5.6 7  1.2 8  -2.1 9.3 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 8.0 7  -2.1 8  -20.0 2.0 
Mining and manufacturing 11.5 7  10.9 8  -1.2 15.7 
Manufacturing 18.1 7  8.2 8  -1.6 15.9 
Electricity, gas and water 22.7 7  -0.0 8  -0.5 14.0 
Services 1.2 7  2.6 8  2.2 9.5 
Producers of government and non-profit services    4.4 
0.3 
Social and Economic Indicators 1953 1960 1980 2000 
6. Production Structure (% at current price)     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 47.3 36.8 14.7 4.7 
Mining and manufacturing 10.1 15.9 29.7 31.6 
Manufacturing 9.0 13.8 28.2 31.3 
Electricity, gas and water 2.6 4.1 10.1 10.8 
Services 40.0 43.2 36.0 43.1 
                                                      
1 1952 
2 1963 
 3 1963 4 Gross National Products 
5 Per Capita GNP 
6 Series at 1995 constant prices 
7 1954 
8 Gross National Products 
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Producers of government and non-profit services   9.5 9.8 
Industrial structure     
Light industries 78.9 76.6 46.4 22.3 
Heavy and chemical industries 21.1 23.4 53.6 77.7 
7. Gross Output and Value-added of Manufacturing  
    (In billion Won,%)     
Gross Output     
Manufacturing 25.39 59.7 36,279.0 564,834.1 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 
(Composition ratio) 
6.7  9
(26.48) 
12.7 
(21.27) 
4,979.4 
(13.73) 
41,129.3 
(7.28) 
Textiles, Wearing apparel and leather 
(Composition ratio) 
9.0  9
(35.57) 
18.1 
(30.32) 
6,495.4 
(17.90) 
40,998.6 
(7.26) 
Wood and products of wood & cork 
(Composition ratio) 
1.7  9
(6.72) 
4.3 
(7.20) 
883.8 
(2.44) 
3,171.7 
(0.56) 
Pulp, paper products, printing and publishing 
(Composition ratio) 
1.5  9
(5.93) 
3.7 
(6.20) 
1,401.6 
(3.86) 
23,214.3 
(4.11) 
Chemical products, refined petroleum products, 
Coke, Rubber and plastic products 
(Composition ratio) 
2.7  9
(10.67) 
9.3 
(15.58) 
10,068.4 
(27.75) 
117,660.4 
(20.83) 
Non-metallic mineral products 
(Composition ratio) 
0.8  9
(3.16) 
3.6 
(6.03) 
1,601.6 
(4.41) 
16,983.3 
(3.01) 
Basic metals 
(Composition ratio) 
0.6  9
(2.37) 
1.8 
(3.02) 
3,387.3 
(9.34) 
44,590.8 
(7.89) 
Fabricated metal products, machinery  
and equipment n.e.c. 
(Composition ratio) 
1.9  9
(7.51) 
5.3 
(8.88) 
6,960.8 
(19.19) 
267,816.0 
(47.41) 
Others 
(Composition ratio) 
0.5  9
(1.98) 
0.9 
(1.51) 
500.7 
(1.38) 
9,269.6 
(1.64) 
Value-added     
Manufacturing  21.9 11,856.60 219,424.60 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 
(Composition ratio)  
4.2 
(7.04) 
1,968.30 
(5.43) 
18,117.70 
(3.21) 
Textiles, Wearing apparel and leather 
(Composition ratio)  
6.4 
(10.72) 
2,311.20 
(6.37) 
17,561.10 
(3.11) 
Wood and products of wood & cork 
(Composition ratio)  
1.4 
(2.35) 
205.9 
(0.57) 
1,285.90 
(0.23) 
Pulp, paper products, printing and publishing 
(Composition ratio)  
1.7 
(2.85) 
526.6 
(1.45) 
10,558.20 
(1.87) 
Chemical products, refined petroleum products, 
Coke, Rubber and plastic products 
(Composition ratio) 
 2.9 (4.86) 
2,427.40 
(6.69) 
35,441.10 
(6.27) 
Non-metallic mineral products 
(Composition ratio)  
2.0 
(3.35) 
682.6 
(1.88) 
8,423.50 
(1.49) 
Basic metals 
(Composition ratio)  
0.5 
(0.84) 
924.1 
(2.55) 
13,917.40 
(2.46) 
Fabricated metal products, machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
(Composition ratio) 
 2.3 (3.85) 
2,587.70 
(7.13) 
110,190.7
0 
(19.51) 
Others 
(Composition ratio)  
0.4 
(0.67) 
222.8 
(0.61) 
3,927.90 
(0.70) 
Social and Economic Indicators 1953 1960 1980 2000 
8. Savings ratio and Investment ratio (%)     
Gross savings ratio 13.1 9.0 24.4 32.4 
Private 11.1 5.0 19.1 19.3 
Domestic gross investment ratio 14.7 10.0 36.2 28.3 
Domestic gross fixed investment ratio 6.9 9.9 34.0 28.5 
Ratio of Investment to abroad -1.6 0.4 -8.5  
Ratio of Exports and Imports to GNI  11.7 16.0 80.3 90.3 
Exports  3.2 4.1 34.6 46.4 
Imports 9.8 12.7 45.8 43.9 
9. Electric Power (In GWh,%)     
Total power generated 736 1,697 37,239 266,400 
Hydro 
(Composition ratio) 
395 
(53.7) 
580 
(34.2) 
1,984 
(5.3) 
5,610 
(2.1) 
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Thermal 
(Composition ratio) 
130 
(17.7) 
1,117 
(65.8) 
31,778 
(85.3) 
151,826 
(57.0) 
Nuclear 
(Composition ratio)   
3,477 
(9.3) 
108,964 
(40.9) 
Power sold 1,154 32,734 239,535 
Consumption per capita (Kwh) 46 859 5,067 
10. Number of Registered Motor Vehicles (In thousand)  
Total 12.8 30.8 527.7 12,059.30 
Passenger cars 3.7 128 249.1 8,083.90 
(Composition ratio) (28.6) (41.5) (47.2)  
Private  1.6 4.2 178.5 7,798.5 
Truck 
(Composition ratio) 
6.8 
(53.3) 
13.4 
(43.7) 
226.9 
(43.0) 2,511.0 
Buses 2.2 4.2 42.5 1,427.2 
Special car 0.2 0.4 9.2 37.1 
Number of Licensed Drivers   1,860.7 18,697.3 
11. Communication System and Number of subscribers     
23,84110Number of communication systems (In thousand) 26 108 2,835 
Analog 26 108 2,815  
Digital   20 23,841 10  
Number of telephone subscribers (in thousands) 23 87 2,705 21,932 
Business   971  
Households   1,734  
Telephone subscribers per 100 people (%)  0.3 7.1 47.5 
Number of public telephone (In Each)  609 58,017 539,983 
12. Overseas Direct Investments (In million US$)     
Total permitted   250.711  
3,668.2 Total invested   145.2 11  
829.7 South-east Asia   52.9 11  
1,159.4 North America   32.7 11  
Europe   5.2 11  142.1 
191.3 Liquidation etc.   18.2 11  
3,476.9 Net invested   127.0 11  
25,816.3 Investment outstanding   127.0 11  
13. Investments from abroad (In million US$)     
Total  47.412 143.1 15,696.7 
U.S.A.  25.0 1 2  70.6 2,922.3 
Japan  8.3 1 2  42.5 2,448.2 
Hong Kong  2.8 1 2  0.5 123.5 
Germany  0.2 1 2  8.6 1,599.4 
United Kingdom  10.5 1 2  2.3 84.3 
France    607.2 
Netherlands   1.8 1,768.4 
Social and Economic Indicators 1953 1960 1980 2000 
14. Elementary School     
Number of School 4,033 4,496 6,487 5,267 
Number of Students 2,259,313 3,622,685 5,658,002 4,019,991 
Female students (%)   48.5  
Enrollment ratio  99.8 102.9 98.7 
Number of Teachers 35,059 61,605 119,064 140,000 
Female teachers (%)  22.0 36.8  
53
Number of Students per teacher 64.4 58.8 47.5 28.7 
Number of Students in a class 57.6 57.0 51.5 35.8 
15. Advance Rate of Graduates to Higher School Level (%)     
Advance Rate of primary school Graduates to middle 
school   95.8 99.9 
Male   97.4 99.9 
Female   94.1 99.9 
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Advance Rate of middle school Graduates to high 
school  70.2
13 84.5 99.6 
Male   87.5 99.6 
Female   80.8 99.6 
Advance Rate of high school Graduates to higher 
education  29.8
13  23.7 68.0 
Male   24.5  
Female   22.5  
16. Composition of Population by Education Attainment 
     (25 Years Old & Over,%)     
Primary School Graduates and Under 91.814 79.615 55.3 23.0 
Male 86.0 1 4  68.9 1 5  42.8 15.1 
Female 97.1 1 4  89.5 1 5  67.0 30.4 
Middle school Graduates 5.3 1 4  11.1 1 5  18.1 13.3 
Male 8.9 1 4  15.9 1 5  19.8 12.3 
Female  2.0 1 4  6.6 1 5  16.5 14.3 
High school Graduates 1.7 1 4  5.6 1 5  18.9 39.4 
Male  2.7 1 4  8.5 1 5  25.4 41.6 
Female  0.7 1 4  2.9 1 5  12.9 37.3 
College, University Graduates and Over 1.3 1 4  3.7 1 5  7.7 24.3 
Male  2.4 1 4  6.7 1 5  12.0 31.0 
Female 0.3 1 4  1.0 1 5  3.6 18.0 
17. Private Institutes (In each, person)     
Institutes  1,13616 5,023 57,935 
Liberal arts & sciences course  214 16  381 14,043 
Art course  193 16  1,485 26,160 
Management business field  92 16  1,367 11,029 
Attendants  52,009 16  411,162 7,772,909 
Liberal arts & sciences course   117,618 1,388,333 
Art course   52,808 987,610 
Management business field   123,922 565,350 
Instructors   13,332 135,637 
Social and Economic Indicators 1953 1960 1980 2000 
18. Public Education Cost per capita 
      (In thousand Won)     
Elementary Schools  4.717 118.5 2,023 
Middle Schools  9.5 1 7  157.2 2,690 
High Schools  19.7 1 7  149.7 2,841 
Junior colleges  53.0 1 7  708.0 3,095 
National & Public  50.4 1 7  893.3 2,471.018
Teacher’s College  44.2 1 7  1,114.0 6,449 
College & university  68.3 1 7  1,036.3 5,526 
4,673.8
 18
National & Public  93.3 1 7  1,198.2 
19. Institutions and Personnel Engaged in R&D     
Research activity performance Institutions  7219 647 4,635 
Research Institutes   124 173 
University & College   202 268 
Companies   321 4,194 
Researchers  1,750 1 9  18,434 159,973 
Research Institutes   4,598  
University & College   8,695 50,155 
Companies    5,141 70,431 
Researchers per 10,000  0.6 1 9  4.8  
                                                     
13 1962  
14 1955 
 
15 1966 
16 1965 
17 1967 
18 1997 
19 1963 
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20. R&D Expenditures character of work (In billion Won)     
Total  1.220 621.721 13,848.5 
2.67 Ratio to GDP (%)  0.24 2 0  0.97  21
Basic research 
(Composition ratio,%)   
113  21
(18.2) 
1,746.1 
(12.61) 
Applied research 
(Composition ratio,%)   
179.4  21
(28.9) 
3,370.1 
(24.34) 
Experimental development 
(Composition ratio,%)   
329.4  21
(53.0) 
8,732.3 
(63.06) 
21. Water supply     
Water supply (In thousand) 3,45122 4,210 20,809 41,774 
Water supply ratio (%)  16.8 54.6 87.1 
Capacity (in thousand ton per day) 240  22 517 6,756 26,980 
Water supply per person a day (liters) 65  22 99 256 380 
Number of Regions with Water Supply (In each) 50  22 58 243 861 
22. Distribution of Income (Gini Coefficient)     
Family and Expenditure Survey   0.345 0.295 
Urban Wage Earners’ Households   0.291 0.317 
23. Labor Union     
Number of Unit unions    2,141 5,698 
Union Members (1,000 persons)   967 1,527 
Union Membership Rate (%)   20.8 12.0 
Number of Labor Dispute Cases   1,873 250 
Working Days Lost (Days)   5,400,837 1,893,563 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Social Indicators in Korea (2001), Korea Statistical Yearbook 
(2001), and Changes in Social and Economic Life in Korea during last Five Decades (1998)  
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